Daily Report

East Europe

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FBIS-EEU-95-030 *14 February 1995*

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Brozi 'Threatened' for Releasing Ethnic Greeks

AU1302192295 Tirana GAZETA SHQIPTARE in Albanian 9 Feb 95 p 1

[Interview with Supreme Court Chairman Zef Brozi by Armand Mero and Edmond Laci; place and date not given: "At 2335 the Four Greek-Speaking Albanians Were Released. Zef Brozi: 'After the Trial I Was Threatened....'"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Tirana—It is 8 February and Zef Brozi has just announced his decision to release the four Greek-speaking Albanians. He comes downstairs from the third floor, where the court room is located, and enters his office. His secretary is waiting for him with the telephone in her hand: "It is for you." Brozi says very little and speaks in a resolute tone: "We answer to no one for the decisions reached by the Supreme Court." The telephone conversation lasts only a few moments and the number-one man of Albanian justice lays down the receiver and says: "You see? Here we go again. They asked me to [word indistinct] the problem of the Greek-speaking Albanians [words indistinct] a new mystery breaks out. The Supreme Court chairman asserts that he was threatened over the phone because of the decision he had just announced. We asked him for the details.

[GAZETA SHQIPTARE] Who was on the phone?

[Brozi] A high-level official.

[GAZETA SHQIPTARE] What did he say to you?

[Brozil] Before I could say hello, he said with irony: "Bravo, you have released the Greek-speaking Albanians, haven't you! You are anti-Albanian. All our efforts and sweat were for nothing, just because of you."

[GAZETA SHQIPTARE] And then?

[Brozi] I told him: "If you are the accuser, why did you not attend the trial? We answer only to the law, and no one else, for the decisions reached by the Supreme Court."

[GAZETA SHQIPTARE] Was that the end of the conversation?

[Brozi] No, not yet. The high-level official used foul language to accuse and threaten me, as chairman of the Supreme Court, but I am not going to mention that.

[GAZETA SHQIPTARE] How would you assess this fact?

[Brozi] Such a brutal interference in the independence of justice never happens in the juridical practice of foreign courts, whereas it happens here and will continue to happen in the future. I am afraid. I do not think that Albanian opinion should keep silent in the face of these facts.

[GAZETA SHQIPTARE] Are you going to take any legal actions?

[Brozil] No, time will judge that official and many others like him.

[GAZETA SHQIPTARE] Brozi then goes to his desk and puts in order the copies of the decision that he has just announced. Outside his office, the lawyers of the four Greek-speaking Albanians are waiting to get one of those copies and then quickly go to the prison and set their clients free.

Government To Begin Privatizing Enterprises

AU1302123995 Tirana GAZETA SHQIPTARE in Albanian 1 Feb 95 p 3

[Article by Gjergj Pilika: "The State as Shareholder"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Tirana—Albania's economic enterprises will be transformed into shareholding companies. This is a concrete step forward that will help the economic enterprises. Their capital will be parcelled in thousands so they can more easily be estimated on the stock market. After this, it will be easier for these enterprises to progress to a possible partial or full privatization. The bill that envisages this—drawn up by Ministry of Commerce, Industry and Transport experts—was approved last Monday by the Albanian Government and will soon be sent to parliament for approval.

The transformation of medium-sized and large enterprises—which account for the largest part of the Albanian economy—into shareholding companies will be a powerful incentive to include these enterprises in a genuine modern and competitive market economy. The division of their capital into shares, ready (as a possibility) to be sold on the market, will lead to a new way of organizing and running these enterprises. Only in this way does the idea of the need for such enterprises and their success in competing with other enterprises producing the same products take concrete shape.

The most important aspect of the future bill will undoubtedly be the inclusion of these enterprises in a natural process of privatization. Since their capital now exists in the form of shares that can be sold on the market, market demand and the state's policy in the area of their operation will make it possible to create real and certain conditions for their possible privatization. At the same time the state will have the right to veto those enterprises a final analysis of which shows that they should remain state-owned.

The bill envisages three possibilities for privatizing these enterprises. First, the state keeps the majority of the shares—that is, more than 50 percent. In this case the administrative management of the enterprise, and marketing, will belong totally to the state. The part sold to various private individuals—this implies that shares can also be bought by the employees of the enterprises—will also serve as a direct and most significant indication of their productivity and competitiveness.

Second, the state possesses less than 50 percent of the shares and does not administer the enterprises.

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Third, the state sells the entire 100 percent of the enterprise's shares, and thus the latter is totally converted into a private enterprise.

The creation of these conditions will eliminate the previous way of creating "joint enterprises," in which the two parties' joint capital has unfortunately been the profit of one side at the expense of the other and not a fair manner of competition. This is shown also by the fact that 70 percent of the joint-venture enterprises have turned out to be utterly unsuccessful.

Transforming Albania's medium-sized and large enterprises into shareholding companies makes more sense of the problem of bonds. The government bodies have already drawn up a strategy according to which the distribution of bonds among the population—where priority will be given to former political persecutees and owners—will at the same time be a centralized form of privatizing various parts of the enterprises.

Walkout Seen To Herald 'Ethnic Confrontation'

AU1302133995 Tirana RILINDJA in Albanian 10 Feb 95 pp 1-2

[Article by R. Tahiri: "Abdurrahman Aliti Tenders Irrevocable Resignation"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Skopje 9 Feb—At its tenth session, the Macedonian parliament yesterday and today debated interethnic relations in Macedonia and the attitude of Macedonian officials to the Albanian population. This was prompted by the presence on the agenda of important bills including the bill on identity cards, the bill on personal names, the bill on civil registers, etc. The Macedonian Government has proposed that identity cards should be in the Macedonian language and the Cyrillic alphabet, while members of the ethnic groups should have the possibility, at their request, of additionally having their names and surnames on their identity cards written in the Albanian language and alphabet.

In their speeches, all the Albanian deputies stressed that citizens' personal documents should be in two languages, both in Macedonian and Albanian, or in the languages of the ethnic groups. Macedonia's multiethnic composition and the equal rights of all citizens must be taken into consideration.

Yesterday's meeting was interrupted when the deputy Sali Ramadani took the floor and, on the basis of the rule book used so far by the assembly, spoke in Albanian. The chairman of the parliament demanded that he stop speaking in his mother tongue and use the official language, Macedonian. Sali Ramadani continued his speech in Albanian, saying that he would also translate it into Macedonian. Stoyan Andov, the chairman, adjourned the meeting and thus the session came to an end. Sali Ramadani continued his speech in Albanian, while the Macedonian deputies left the hall. The Albanian deputies heard the speech out to the end.

In his speech, Ramadani said that a bogus brotherhood and unity prevails in Macedonia and we must discuss whether we should remain in the assembly or not. This body of Macedonian politicians has a pro-Serbian bias, and we must unite with VMRO [Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization], which is a Macedonian national party, and demand new elections. It is evident that this parliament and this government are anti-Albanian.

Yesterday's meeting was scheduled to continue at 1000 [0900 GMT] today. At the start of the meeting, the Albanian deputies demanded an explanation of why speeches in Albanian were not allowed. Chairman Andov said that this is in keeping with the Constitution. The Albanian deputies did not agree with this, saying that this infringes on their human and national rights and is not in accordance with Macedonia's goal so far of equal development for all nationalities in every sphere. After vocal disagreements, the Albanian deputies demonstratively left the hall, while the Macedonian deputies, who have an absolute majority in the parliament, approved the bills on the agenda in the form proposed by the government, not heeding any of the criticisms made by the Albanian deputies.

Abdurrahman Aliti, who is both deputy chairman of the parliament and chairman of the Party for Democratic Prosperity, issued a written declaration announcing his resignation from the post of deputy chairman of the Macedonian parliament. He gave as a reason for this the fact that the Macedonian side had not been prepared to heed the fair demands of the Albanians and is irresponsible even as far as the destiny of Macedonia itself is concerned. It is thought that this new rift along national lines in the Macedonian parliament means that Macedonia is entering into new tensions involving elements of ethnic confrontation and the construction of separate systems for the national communities living as citizens of Macedonia. The view prevails that the previous agreements reached during the elections and the formation of the Macedonian Government have been abandoned. The Albanian deputies in the Macedonian parliament consider that they cannot give way as far as their national demands and the mandate given to them by the people are concerned.

Socialist Party Urges Closer European Cooperation

AU1302181095 Tirana INTERVISTA in Albanian 6-12 Feb 95 pp 1-2

[Interview with Socialist Party Deputy Chairman Luan Hajdaraga by Artan Kristo; place and date not given: "The Socialist Party Will Ask Europe Not for Charity but for Cooperation"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Passage omitted]

7. The Joint Albanian-U.S. Military Maneuvers Have Ended

[Kristo] The joint Albanian-U.S. military maneuvers ended earlier this week. Immediately following the exercises, a high-ranking U.S. military delegation visited

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Albania. What does this broadening of relations between our country and the United States in the military sphere mean to you?

sw;8.5q[Hajdaraga] We of course applaud the recent initiatives to broaden military cooperation between Albania and the United States because we think that our army needs to apply the U.S. Army's structures and models in its own units. And what is more important, it needs to cooperate with the United States, since it is a primary player in the Partnership for Peace program. I am glad to see that these maneuvers and contacts are increasing; however, we would like to see the same maneuvers and close cooperation with other European armies, within the framework of the Partnership for Peace initiative and NATO. I would also like to add that military cooperation should be accompanied by closer cooperation in economics and politics with both the United States and other countries.

Right Wing Seen as Answer to Corruption

AU1302181695 Tirana E DJTHTA in Albanian 7 Feb 95 pp 1-2

[Commentary by F. Arbri: "Corruption Is Suffocating Albania"]

[FBIS Translated Text] At a meeting of Tirana PD [Democratic Party] activists on 5 June 1993, corruption was openly denounced as a phenomenon spreading its tentacles throughout the country, right across the spectrum.

The PD leaders, instead of listening to this signal, turned a deaf ear to it and chose to slide ever deeper into the filth of corruption that has swept over Albania's economic, social, and political life. The period of transition from a centralized to a market economy is being characterized by the emergence and vigorous development of anonymous mafia organizations and the state mafia, that in unison are plundering everything that yields profits, using both legal and illegal methods to divide up their spheres of activity and stifling anyone who wants to make a honest living.

Alongside common criminals and thieves, flourishing unfettered, "businessmen" and speculators have sprung to life. Through "liberalized" prices they are earning stupefying profits of which even the most outstanding businessmen in the West would never dream. Thus, sucking the poor people's blood like mosquitoes, the first Albanian millionaires—and millionaires not in leks but in dollars—have come into being in record time. Their ranks are growing at an astonishing rate. Most of them are linked, through secret ties, with those in power, who help them lay their hands on every project and enterprise. The latter award them licenses, secure profitable customs clearances and low tariffs for them, and so on—taking, of course, their cut for all these services. Among these "businessmen" there is a category of people who play the role of the screen behind which the real masters, the high-ranking state functionaries, hide. You find many such people as "owners" of luxurious restaurants, tourist hotels, gas stations, and anonymous companies importing fuel, cigarettes, and other profitable goods. The most profitable operations have become a monopoly of certain firms.

Thus, the PD firms "Shqiponja" and "Evroili" control a monopoly on fuel. With powerful people from the ruling elite at their head and on their management boards, these two firms bar the way for other companies by all possible means. A case in point is the fight these two companies are waging against the API fuel company. On a number of occasions, API has not been allowed to unload its cargo at the port of Durres, forcing it to unload at Vlore, which of course entails higher costs. They do this in order to prevent any fall in fuel prices. Fuel in Albania is four times more expensive than in the United States, twice as expensive as in Bulgaria, and more expensive than in Greece, Italy, and so on.

Other merchants who do not belong to the clans of the ruling people are also suffering from this fierce competition. A typical example is the suspicious sequestration of a consignment of Marlboro cigarettes in order to pave the way for Cooper cigarettes—the monopoly on which, it is said, belongs to two high-ranking PD officials.

Corruption is well established in the state administration. As if nothing had happened and quite openly, they ask you for bribes for the most routine services. Prosecutors and judges are said to take fat bribes. There are those who say that many members of the forces of law and order are doing the same thing. Corruption thus suffocates people who do not know how to protect themselves from it. The "racket" [previous word in English] is becoming commonplace. Owners of kiosks, shops, etc. are being threatened, and called upon to pay enormous sums if they do not want to get into trouble. People from the finance police look upon racketeering as a very profitable activity. So, we have started our march toward Europe passing via the dens of thieves and criminals. Poor as we are, passing through these channels we will reach Europe barefoot and naked, if we ever get there at all. The transition, thanks to the "wise" and "competent" policy of the government and the PD, is transforming our owners step-by-step.

Many political forces are striving to pose as advocates of the fight against corruption. The Socialists are also speaking in a loud voice against corruption, promising to restore order if they win. There are those who believe in these sweet socialist promises, but most Albanians know very well that the very first thieves, speculators, and swindlers who started and fed corruption were, precisely, the Socialists—that is the former communists of the Party of Labor.

A great number of former top Communist functionaries have become accomplished businessmen. They have their shops or restaurants; are engaged in profitable businesses, currency exchange offices, etc. Many of them have become partners with the PD people in power. In nearly half of Albania, they have power locally. Yes, in nearly half of Albania, they have local power in their hands; and just as in

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those places where the PD people have the power, or even worse, they do so many vile things.

The Socialists are screaming and yelling, not because they are really interested in the fight against corruption but because they are dissatisfied because other mafia people from the PD camp are successfully competing against them. The Albanians must become aware that neither the PD nor the Socialists are going to combat corruption, nor is any other party that is benefiting from these business activities. Once in power, all these political forces will defend the same interests: the interests of the speculators, the new capitalists. Only the right wing has the ability to combat corruption at its roots. Only the right wing is interested in stripping the communists and semicommunists of their power and restoring [passage indistinct] expropriated by communism. Only the right wing is interested in restoring law, order, and discipline in Albania. Only the victory of the right wing will save Albania from the bloodthirsty vampires of corruption.

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KDU-CSL Offers To Merge With KDS

LD1302162595 Prague Radiozurnal Radio Network in Czech 1400 GMT 13 Feb 95

[FBIS Translated Text] The Christian Democratic Union-Czechoslovak People's Party [KDU-CSL] has offered a merger to the Christian Democratic Party [KDS]. This was confirmed in Brno today by the chairman of the KDU-CSL Moravian-Silesian land organization, Stanislav Belehradek. According to him, there is no space in our republic for several Christian parties.

Minister Discusses Army Reform, Defense Issues

AU1302153495 Prague RESPEKT in Czech No 6, 6-12 Feb 95 p 12

[Interview with Czech Defense Minister Vilem Holan by Jaroslav Spurny; place and date not given: "Whoever Does Nothing Will Not Spoil Anything"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Spurny] In your opinion, what is the Czech Republic's military role in the future Europe and in the world? What can we offer so that our advanced partners really take an interest in us?

[Holan] This is a question for a more fundamental debate. It is no use just repeating too often that we want to join NATO. First and foremost, we should create an extremely capable, effective, flexible, and, at the same time, small defense force so that we make life exceedingly unpleasant for anyone who wants to invade our territory. All of the steps in the Army's transformation have to be oriented toward ensuring that our Army can proceed smoothly into the milieu of the North Atlantic Alliance. Our Army's strength is limited. We can defend ourselves against some but not others, and, in this case, we will need help.

However, we are not just Czechs, but also Europeans. We want to be—or rather, we are—part of Western culture, so we also share the responsibility for Europe's security. In my opinion, not only territory but mainly civilization is the subject of defense today. Therefore, we are also emphasizing the transatlantic dimension of the Alliance. This is a specific culture, a specific civilization, and it is worth standing up for it. As far as the Czech military contribution is concerned, we are involved in peacekeeping missions, and we also send observers to military flashpoints.

[Spurny] Our admission into NATO is being spoken of as a fait accompli. However, NATO is seeking its own shape. So, let us allow for the possibility that, in the end, it will not expand. Is there a defense alternative for us, for instance, something like a Central European defensive grouping?

[Holan] A different alternative does not make sense.

[Spurny] Various military documents, including the "Military Strategy" approved by the government, talk about security risks. Mostly, it is not stated fully, but we can read between the lines that Czech military circles are concerned, first and foremost, about Russia and the Sudeten Germans. Is this true?

[Holan] The document you are talking about is intended partly for our public and partly for abroad. As far as the risks are concerned, we refer to them more objectively than from the point of view of their locale. Indeed, we are saying that, for example, the economic instability in some of the countries of the former Soviet Union is behind this because it causes social instability and political extremism. The countries of the former Yugoslavia are another example: ethnic and religious conflicts.

There are well-known areas in Europe where there is pressure to change the borders. This does not concern our country or even the Sudeten Germans, however. This represents a huge advantage for us on the road to the North Atlantic Alliance. We have good relations with our neighbors, and there are no nationalist tendencies or conspicuous extremist tensions here.

10 Points

[Spurny] Two weeks ago the parliamentary committees did not approve the draft constitutional law on defense. Will this have any influence on the running of your department? Should a state of emergency be declared by the government or parliament?

[Holan] At the moment, opinion on who declares a state of emergency is not unanimous. However, it is necessary to emphasize that the issue here involves the principles for the law. The Defense Ministry has only one principle—that is, the duty to provide general defense. Others concern the issue of running the state in a crisis situation. Of course, we need a law on defense very urgently: We will base other legal norms—for example, the military service law or the law on the Army—on it.

[Spurny] What does the law on defense involve?

[Holan] The means of running the state under extraordinary circumstances. Parliament thinks that it should declare a state of emergency; it says in the "principles" that the government declares it. A compromise solution will probably be found; however, I am worried that, if a major earthquake, floods, and such are included in it, the debate will degenerate into a theoretical discussion on what exactly an emergency is. The debate would last a long time, and the Defense Ministry would have to halt work on so many important legal norms. In this sphere, I would like 1995 to be a breakthrough year.

[Spurny] You visited the United States two months after you were appointed. From a certain point of view, this was a very beneficial visit for our Army. For example, the Americans will sell us advanced computer technology. Whose initiative was this?

[Holan] Interest was mutual. We refrained from discussions on general political theories and concentrated on practical steps. We found out what kind of assistance the

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Americans can give us free of charge and what we will have to pay for. We discussed technical rapprochement and agreed that computer technology, the issue of the command and communications systems, is the most important. Of course, we will consider our options. Other important talks were held on air defense. The question of whether MiG's or F-16's is far from being the most fundamental one. Aircraft play an important role in air defense but not the only one. Information systems, air traffic control, monitoring the airspace, and reconnaissance activity are equally important. That is a lot of technology that, again, should be compatible with NATO. By the way, the talks were very significant, but this somehow went unnoticed by the public.

[Spurny] You have a 10-point program that outlines what you will give priority to in your work. What do you want to change at the ministry?

[Holan] My plan is restricted by the electoral period. It is impossible to do everything during this period, but you can do a great deal of work if you select the right priorities. I am interested in personnel policy, which has not been dealt with very much, and in transforming military education, which will come to an end in five years, when the students who are now beginning their studies graduate. I am also interested in taking effective steps toward NATO, especially in the technical convergence of weapons. I am also placing emphasis on discipline; I am trying to encourage it by means of plenty of checks in the units. I am also striving for progress in legislation.

An Upturned Pyramid

[Spurny] The majority of our most senior generals and officers studied in the USSR. The corps' linguistic ability is pitiful. How can we go into NATO like that?

[Holan] This could add up to a separate article because I have a lot on my mind about this. The Army certainly lived for some time in the past; it took on totalitarian habits. Then, one-quarter of the career soldiers left or were dismissed. Some preferred lucrative business deals to serving their country. Many people left of their own volition in December 1993 in order to avoid the extraordinary screenings.

There are many high-quality soldiers among those who stayed. Incidentally, every institution proceeds from people's good qualities and not their bad ones. And they are loyal to the democratic state. The majority of them are taking an active part in transformation. Hundreds of people have been trained in foreign academies—in France, the United States, Germany, the Netherlands, and Canada—and, apart from languages, they are bringing back the modern spirit of democratic armies. The process of changing the personnel will certainly not be completed during this electoral period, however.

[Spurny] One-sixth of our career soldiers are officers with the rank of colonel. Is this not a little much?

[Holan] Certainly! The most senior officers should be in the minority, and the most junior ranks should be in the majority. We have an upturned pyramid here. Today, there are 20,000 officers and 10,000 ensigns in the service. It should be the other way around. We are trying to reverse this, but it is a slow process. We are trying to keep officers for a certain period. We have also halted automatic promotion. This is one of the ways of changing this situation. The communist concept of soldiers for life simply caused inflation in the most senior ranks. We would like to alter this by the year 2000.

[Spurny] How steady is the chair of Chief of the General Staff Jiri Nekvasil?

[Holan] The president fills this post. I think the current phase of transformation should be completed by those who started it. You should not change horses when your wagon is going up the hill.

New Weapons, Old Zones

[Spurny] The ministry has published its acquisition plan for up to the year 2005. It contains a proposal for reequipping the Army and an estimate of how much it will cost (120 billion korunas [Kc]). If, however, we project a 5-percent rise in the gross domestic product [GDP] per annum and the Army always gets 2.5 percent of the GDP and apportions one-third of it for investments, then roughly Kc20 billion is still missing. Is the acquisition plan realistic?

[Holan] We would have to go through the method of financing the Army. This Kc120 billion is not dogma. It will depend on the economy's possibilities. The plan will be refined and altered every year; a change in priorities cannot be ruled out. But I can conceive that the very moment of our admission into NATO, the more rapid reconstruction of barracks, dealing with the soldiers' accommodation, or reequipping the Air Force in a shorter space of time would also require finance over and above the standard military budget.

[Spurny] Army orders are a gold mine for many companies. Parliamentary deputies often meddle in your economic initiatives. Could they not be members of various industrial lobbies? Can you tell when they have matter-of-fact reservations and when they are representing the interests of a specific enterprise?

[Holan] This is an area for my economic deputy. Of course, people sometimes mention to me that they would like to supply their products to the Army, but I always react the same way: Here is the number; call the deputy minister responsible for economic affairs. Moreover, we deal with everything by competition. I feel under most pressure, perhaps, in the sphere of the civilian use of military zones.

[Spurny] What will you do with them? The size of our military zones is unusual in Europe. For example, even in Germany, they do not have such large areas.

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[Holan] We want to draft a long-term plan; I have already asked the experts to do this. Some zones can be reduced in size, but Libava, for instance, will remain the way it is because, following the breakup of the federation, we had to transfer the training exercises there that had previously been carried out in Slovakia. Studies are being prepared on the other zones.

[Spurny] Slovakia recently made a claim to part of the archives of the former military counterintelligence. V. Meciar even says, in this context, that the Czech side is using agents living in Slovakia. Is it possible to hand over part of the archives to the Slovaks?

[Holan] Of course, we will discuss this with the Slovak side, but a presidential treaty, which would resolve this, is lacking. We are willing to meet our Slovak colleagues half way by making it possible for them to examine the archives on a case-by-case basis.

Prestige

[Spurny] What do you do in your free time? Do you shoot, like your predecessor?

[Holan] No. Except for the Christmas holidays, I have not had any free time since I took office.

[Spurny] What mistakes made by Antonin Baudys would you like to avoid?

[Holan] I do not think it is possible to build a career on emphasizing the possible mistakes made by one's predecessor. My colleague Baudys did a great deal of work here. Of course, there were mistakes. But, whoever does nothing, will also not spoil anything.

[Spurny] By the way, under Baudys, the Army's prestige was the highest during the past five years—more than 50 percent of the population trusted it; this figure is only 30 percent today. You declared recently that it is the same in surrounding states. But in Poland, for instance, 70 percent of citizens trust the Army—that is, more than the church.

[Holan] I was talking about Western states, where approximately 40 percent support the army. According to the polls, in our country the Army was previously trusted by the left wing; now it is trusted more by the right wing. In some regions, relations between the public and the Army are on a cordial level. There, a commander can go to the mayor or representative body and they can assist each other. Sometimes the polls say more about society than the Army. People do not like to admit that they are faced with some danger, and the Army, after all, is associated with the onset of danger. Moreover, people are willing to defend what it is worth their while defending. When our citizens feel that we are a prosperous country, they will certainly be willing to defend their wealth.

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Meciar, Chernomyrdin Comment on Agreements

LD1302205795 Bratislava Rozhlasova Stanica Slovensko Network in Slovak 1730 GMT 13 Feb 95

[FBIS Translated Text] [Announcer] Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin began his first foreign visit this year and his first visit to the independent Slovakia when he arrived in Bratislava today. He has now accomplished the working part of his two-day visit. In 20 minutes, Chernomyrdin is expected at an opera performance in the Slovak National Theater. Before this, however, he held a series of meetings with his host, Slovak Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar. In the afternoon, Chernomyrdin was received by Slovak President Michal Kovac. Our correspondent Jan Smihula has more details:

[Smihula] It is already possible to say that the two-day visit of Viktor Chernomyrdin has reached its peak. The climax of the visit took place this afternoon, when 12 agreements were signed. Five of the agreements were confirmed by the signatures of both prime ministers. The documents concern cooperation in culture, education, and science; visa-free travel and mutual employment of the citizens; and contacts between regions and cooperation between individual companies, including operation of the Tatra Air joint-stock company.

Six intergovernment and two interdepartment agreements due to be signed were the most discussed subject even before the Russian prime minister's arrival in Bratislava. As it was proved today, the expectations were not only fulfilled but also exceeded. This was the reason for the apparent satisfaction both prime ministers showed during a brief meeting with journalists at the government office .

Slovak Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar recalled the recent history of Slovak-Russian relations.

[Meciar] In 1992, when I met Prime Minister Chernomyrdin, who then was a deputy prime minister, we made a plan to build Slovak-Russian relations on a new basis. To achieve this, we established an adequate ground on agreements; in the past two years, Slovakia and the Russian Federation signed more than 40 agreements. Cooperation between the Slovak Republic and Russia has its tradition, but these days a new era begins, involving, for example, cooperation among companies, sharing scientific results, and working toward even closer cooperation in the market. The Slovak Republic is much smaller than the Russian Federation, but it is a reliable partner. [end recording]

[Smihula] When talking about the agreements signed today and the overall relations between both countries, Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin also showed contentment:

[Begin Chernomyrdin recording, in Russian with superimposed Slovak translation] The signed agreements essentially create a basis for further, more advanced cooperation between our countries. The agreements and the agreement on cooperation in culture, education, and science,in particular, will enable us to work much more efficiently and on a broader scale. Our countries have great potential that has not yet been touched. I believe that today's meetings and talks, which involved experts from both countries, will be a huge impetus in our mutual relations. [end recording]

[Smihula] I would only add that the Russian prime minister ends his two-day visit to Bratislava tomorrow with a morning meeting with businessmen and an afternoon news conference.

Sitek Confers With U.S. General on Cooperation

LD1302182995 Bratislava Rozhlasova Stanica Slovensko Network in Slovak 1100 GMT 13 Feb 95

[FBIS Translated Text] My colleague Miroslav Minar is on the line now to talk about discussions between Slovak Defense Minister Jan Sitek and U.S. General Gerald Allen on the implementation of the mil-to-mil program and other forms of cooperation in the military sphere. Here is Miroslav Minar with more details direct from the Defense Ministry:

[Minar] The mil-to-mil program, which means from army to army, is an expression of U.S. help to the armies of Central and East Europe. The plan covers a four-year period and is being coordinated by the U.S.European Command based in Stuttgart, Germany. All activities taking place within the framework of this program are run directly by the Plans and Policy Department of the aforementioned command center. The department chief is General Gerald Allen, who, in the company of U.S. Ambassador to Slovakia Theodore Russell, is at this moment still engaged in talks with Defense Minister Jan Sitek about certain aspects of mutual cooperation. Within the mil-to-mil program, cooperation is primarily centered on the training of our officers, specialist seminars, language courses, and so on—in other words, on all activities except exercises. All of this is being funded in full by the United States.

With almost two years of it to look back on, Minister-Sitek was able to confirm that this program is important for us, particularly from the viewpoint of our orientation toward transatlantic security structures. That is why our proposals for joint activities, which are to be discussed on Wednesday and Thursday in Stuttgart, are aimed in this particular direction.

According to the latest information from the Foreign Relations Department of the Slovak Defense Ministry, approximately 20 joint activities are to take place in the second quarter of 1995.

Meciar Threatens 'Measures' on Carpathian Issue

LD1302160795 Bratislava Rozhlasova Stanica Slovensko Network in Slovak 1100 GMT 13 Feb 95

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] At a session of the Carpathian Euroregion held in Debrecen [Hungary] at the end of

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December, eight Slovak districts and the town of Kosice were accepted as full members. However, at a session last week, the government of Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar expressed its disapproval of the membership of the eight East Slovak districts in the Carpathian Euroregion. [passage omitted]

Editor Martin Bartisek interviewed Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar about the specific reasons that led the government to disapprove of the membership of Slovak districts in the Carpathian Euroregion:

[Begin recording] [Bartisek] The government says that laws were not observed when nine districts of the Slovak Republic joined the Carpathian Euroregion and insists on an unconditional revocation of their membership in this association. Prime Minister, was the law really so seriously violated, or is the issue one of foreign economic influences that might perhaps have a negative impact on Slovakia?

[Meciar] Let us make clear who represents a district in our country. It is the chairman of the district office. Among those attending the talks was not a single chairman of the district office. Nobody can delegate himself or call himself a representative of a district. Such a person is a pretender and must not act on behalf of an administrative entity.

The other point is that once the Slovak Republic as a whole has observer status in a certain institution, its territorial part should not be a member if this contradicts the principle adopted by the government. Yes, we make it possible for villages to communicate with each other, jto cooperate, and to form unions. This, however, does not apply to their foreign relations abroad because the state policy has to be respected. This is not possible. [passage omitted]

The other point is that a part of Slovak territory can become a member only with a government's approval. Nobody has asked for such approval. This concerns the principle of our sovereignty.

In two years of its existence, the Carpathian Euroregion has not made any contribution. It was all consultations and empty bubbles.

If somebody says today that he has 7 million korunas to distribute among four states to support a dynamic development of this region, our question is: Why? As the issues of trade relations and cooperation do not take first place, and, instead, issues of bringing about awareness of historical identity of coexistence within this region as regards geography, history, and language take their place, we say this is politics, this is not the original purpose of the Carpathian Euroregion.

This is why the government adopted a stance that the course of action taken by those villages contradicts the law of the land. It contradicts the agreement on the basis of which the Slovak Republic joined the Carpathian Euroregion, calling on the appropriate bodies of the Carpathian Euroregion to annul immediately their decision on accepting the nine Slovak districts. If this is not the case, the government reserves the right to take unilateral steps.

As regards those who signed the agreements, violating valid laws, acting on behalf of districts without having been empowered to do so by the state or by [word indistinct] bodies of the districts' territorial administration, in their case we made a recommendation to the interior minister to ask the bodies dealing with criminal proceedings to check that those people did not exceed their powers. It is not possible for any pretender to declare himself to be a representative of the state, government, or a territorial entity. [passage omitted] [end recording]

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Horn Views NATO, EU Membership Issues

AU1402122895 Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian 13 Feb 95 pp 1, 3

[Interview with Prime Minister Gyula Horn by "K.T."; place and date not given: "NATO in 1996, EU in 2000?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] West Europe cannot be left unmoved by the fate of our region, including that of Hungary. Hungary has a good chance in its application for admission to the European organizations of integration. These were the issues mentioned by Prime Minister Gyula Horn assessing his visit to Brussels and Luxembourg in an interview with our correspondent.

[NEPSZABADSAG] NATO and the European Union [EU] were almost always in the focus of your talks during your four-day tour. Would you endeavor to specify a concrete date for the admission of Hungary?

[Horn] In my view, admission to NATO might take place first, because NATO does not have long-term economic conditions as does the EU. The relevant NATO decision—for orientation, if nothing else—might be made as early as the end of 1995 or the first half of 1996. In that case, it is not entirely impossible that we might become a member of NATO as early as 1996. Naturally, there is no guarantee for this at the moment.

As for the EU, this is a completely different issue. The "White Paper" that is to contain the conditions is still being drawn up; there are plans to have it completed by May. Naturally, it would be best if the affected East-Central European countries and the EU members jointly formulated the conditions, but we cannot expect this. However, we have been promised consultations on these issues. The consultations will take place before the EU countries receive the White Paper; this is to be welcomed because we would not like to be made to face too strict or impossible conditions. Well, if I start from the premise that a number of EU member-states support our proposal that the review conference to be convened next year should define the date of beginning the talks on membership, and that these talks will take at least three years, then, in an optimal case, our EU membership might become a reality around the year 2000.

[NEPSZABADSAG] What are the most important Hungarian tasks in the period until then? What did your negotiating partners emphasize during your talks as regards our preparation for the EU?

[Horn] The full establishment of a market economy, preferably in the coming three to four years, is a basic and decisive condition. Establishing the system of market institutions and adjusting them to the EU structure is part of this. Legal harmonization is at least as important. And then I have not yet mentioned strengthening the financial and economic situation, which primarily means reducing the deficit of state administration and the payment balance. It is obvious that we have to stabilize our financial situation in the coming years; this is an essential condition.

[NEPSZABADSAG] Before your visit, certain views to the effect that the timing was not very favorable for negotiations could be heard. One reason is that [European Commission President Jacques] Santer's Union Committee is still too new. On the other hand, domestic complications, ministerial dismissals and appointments, could also disturb the situation. To what extent did these two factors complicate the talks?

[Horn] They did not at all. Whether or not one considers these factors as disturbing is a matter of perception. It is true that the Union Committee has just been set up but it is important, precisely at the launching of the committee, to inform them about Hungary's needs and to discuss these and Hungary's situation. In my view, it is decidedly good that these newly elected bodies were informed about Hungarian and Central European conditions. I would add that, in my experience, none of the European leaders are left unmoved by the fate of this region, including that of Hungary. As for the domestic ministerial changes, if any of my partners mentioned the issue at all—which was not typical—they expressed their satisfaction that reformers were placed into key economic positions.

[NEPSZABADSAG] You raised a contradiction in the European Parliament that which seems like a catch-22 situation. On the one hand, the EU sets very strict conditions to the region, but the region cannot meet these conditions on its own, without the West's help. How can this dilemma be resolved?

[Horn] Yes, this is a very significant contradiction. No country exists in East-Central Europe that could establish the conditions for change on its own, without foreign resources. The current task is to make the West aware of the importance of this support through persistent talks and frequent meetings. In the coming months—until the end of 1995 or the summer of 1996—major, one could say enormous, questions will be decided within the EU, including the decisionmaking mechanism and formulating the new agricultural policy. Almost all important issues will be decided. In other words, the EU's short and medium-term future is on the agenda. This is precisely the reason it is important that they do not forget about us even for a moment. This means very tough and daily work for us, because the conditions for admitting new members will not be formulated overnight.

[NEPSZABADSAG] What are the chances for the EU to take the Hungarian memorandum that was prepared for the Essen summit into consideration when the membership criteria are formulated?

[Horn] We have handed over this document to all organizations and states concerned. The number one task now is to become involved in dialogues and consultations at all levels. In addition to the economy, we have

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to extend our relations to foreign and security policy, the areas of justice and internal affairs, and all those sectors that are included in the European processes of integration. On the other hand, we made concrete proposals on extending the association council's spheres of operation and authority.

[NEPSZABADSAG] Your attention was frequently drawn to the importance of settling the neighborhood problems. Talks on the basic treaty are under way with Romania and Slovakia. However, the Hungarian organizations abroad do not consider the Strasbourg framework agreement on national minority protection sufficient for settling their problems. They require more than that. Will the Hungarian Government be content with the Strasbourg formulations when it comes to drawing up the basic treaties?

[Horn] Our partners have indeed laid great emphasis on drawing our attention to settling the neighborhood problems. On the one hand, the drafts that we have in recent days presented to Romania and Slovakia—the two do not have differences of principle—do indeed take the stipulations of the Strasbourg framework agreement on national minority protection into consideration. On the other hand, they are based on the EU's rules, requirements, and norms relating to the national minorities. It is possible for us now to choose the road—and we have to be flexible in this respect—by which the signatories undertake, in this document, to fulfill the European requirements, and it seems to me that the Slovak Government might be a partner to this. Naturally, we also hope that Romania will also be a partner. However, there is an open question even in this case: What will be the guarantees for keeping to these norms, and how will they be supervised? I find our agreement with Vladimir Meciar very encouraging: Representatives of the two countries and experts of the Council of Europe should together examine whether commitments are met, and they should make concrete proposals when commitments are not implemented. In my view, this would be a European solution and an encouraging step forward for the Hungarians living in Slovakia and Romania. I believe that we could be happy if the minority rights of the Hungarians in Slovakia and Romania prevailed on a West European level.

Kovacs Discusses Relations With Neighbors

AU1302140395 Budapest 168 ORA in Hungarian 7 Feb 95 pp 10-11

[Interview with Foreign Minister Laszlo Kovacs by Jozsef Barat; place and date not given: "Hungary Abroad"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Barat] It is clear that Hungary's media image has not been as bad as it now is for a long time. At the moment, I cannot even recall a time when all at once so many criticisms and concerns appeared in the world press in connection with our domestic affairs as now, after the HungarHotels case and the resignation of Finance Minister Bekesi. In your view, is there a danger that, in the eyes of the West, we will be left behind Poland and the Czech Republic for good?

[Kovacs] I do not feel that, all in all, the assessment of Hungary is negative. It was considerably worse, for example, when Csurka's [chairman of the Hungarian Justice and Life Party] essay was being discussed in the U.S. legislature. A section of the international press did indeed receive the prime minister's intervention in the HungarHotels case with a certain aversion. In my view, this is understandable, because business does not like government intervention—especially not in privatization. Very strong interests are attached to privatization and any kind of intervention can harm interests. However, I know many examples of governments and prime ministers of other countries, including various West European countries, who intervened in a similar way, either because a legal violation had been committed during the procedure or perhaps because an asset was to be sold well below its value. This is precisely what happened in Hungary. Naturally it is true, and we are aware, that a new government is watched with particular expectations, interest, and perhaps certain reservations.

[Barat] Especially if it is a Socialist government, and people who are occasionally called communists or former communists in the world press.

[Kovacs] This is true. I felt it my duty to call the government's attention to this point at the government meeting when this issue was discussed. I said that our decision should meet three requirements at the same time. First: A bad deal that is obviously disadvantageous to Hungary should not be made. Second: We should come out of it with Hungary's international image's suffering the smallest possible damage. Third: No such case should ever happen again. I believe that the decision that was finally made by the government more or less meets these three criteria. Actually, our international image now, after Bekesi's resignation, greatly depends on the government's future economic policy.

[Barat] It is often asked who actually decides foreign policy, Gyula Horn or Laszlo Kovacs. You obviously have some kind of division of labor. How does the decisionmaking mechanism work?

[Kovacs] I will give you a current example from the Hungarian-Slovak talks. The Foreign Ministry earlier drew up two versions for a solution. One is that we lay down the national minority rights in the basic treaty in relatively great detail and in the spirit of the relevant international and European documents. Naturally, this solution would, in a certain sense, make the text of the basic treaty disproportionate. Why? Due to its nature, the border or territorial clause—namely, the recognition of the inviolability of borders and the declaration that the two sides will not make territorial demands against each other—which are required by our two affected neighbors, namely Romania and Slovakia—can be done in a few sentences. It is impossible to write more than a few lines on this issue.

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The statement of the national minority rights cannot be satisfactorily done so briefly. Well, this is the reason we thought our partner might find the treaty disproportionate; therefore, we drew up another possibility. In this case, the treaty would only briefly touch on the rights of national minorities and just lay down the basic principles.

Another national minority protection agreement is closely linked, even in a legal sense, to the basic treaty contains the rights of the national minorities in detail. So the Foreign Ministry formulated the two alternatives. At Horn's meeting with Meciar, Horn saw that the second version had a better chance for agreement. Therefore, he decided there, at the negotiating table, that it was expedient to agree on that one. Accordingly, the two prime ministers instructed the two foreign ministers present to get their staff to speed up work on preparing this version of the basic treaty, and they also agreed that the documents should be ready for signing before 21 March, the beginning of the European stability conference in Paris.

[Barat] So you had the decision alternatives drawn up but Horn himself made the decision during the talks.

[Kovacs] Correct. Contrary to some opinions, foreign policy is not at all the art of improvisation. It is the art of very consistent and thorough work. In other words, a seemingly improvised decision usually has many months or even years of preparatory work behind it. A small country in particular cannot allow itself the luxury of not thinking in terms of various versions of decisions and various scenarios. I found it a great defect of foreign policy in the past four years that this kind of decision-preparation and analytical work was completely missing. Hungarian foreign policy did not consider the various possible outcomes of the south Slav crisis. They did not draw up Hungarian foreign policy's possible responses to this. Therefore, I pay much attention to this work in the Foreign Ministry. We have established a system where the ministry's leadership, together with experts on the given issue, regularly evaluate issues that are of importance for Hungarian foreign policy. The experiences of the first such discussion were very favorable. Therefore, I am planning to continue this and to expand the range of participants with external experts.

[Barat] It has recently become fashionable in Western media circles to reproach us and to praise the Czech Republic. One reason for this is that Czech Prime Minister Klaus is very good at making people acknowledge his country's results—even if, God forbid, the results have not been implemented. We, on the other hand, being captives of some kind of propaganda of failure, like to portray ourselves in a negative light. Would it not be worthwhile for us, too, to bluff a little bit? If people believe the bluff, then it could bring millions of dollars in investments. The same amount can be taken away due to ill-timed self-reproach.

[Kovacs] I am certain the bluffs only have a short-term effect in important decisionmaking centers and in the business world. Of course, it is true that cautious foreign investors can be discouraged if we paint things too black. At any rate, I believe that, all in all, Hungary's image is not worse than the Czech Republic's or Poland's. It is true that some opinions list Hungary behind Poland and the Czech Republic, but other assessments also exist—I have just recently read one that was commissioned by the European Union and prepared in the Union's member states—according to which the majority of those questioned believe Hungary has the biggest chance for membership.

Anyway, we do not consider accession as some kind of a race. For us, the important task is to prepare for membership as fast as possible, and the gates should be opened to Hungary when it can meet the requirements. Whether someone gets through these gates from this region before we do or whether we ourselves are the first is secondary.

[Barat] However, it could be awkward if the gates were shut in our face. This is also a possibility. We know that bickering and quarreling countries are not welcome in the elegant House of Europe. They might say that the cases of Poland and the Czech Republic are simpler, and that until the Hungarians settle their relations with Romania, they should stay outside, they should not bring in their constant tensions.

[Kovacs] Based on experience, my opinion is that Hungary and its neighbors will indeed not get into the European Union until they settle their debates in a civilized way. When Meciar arrived in Budapest from Brussels and Horn asked him in the evening at a select meeting what the most important experiences of his Brussels talks were, the first thing he mentioned was that all the leaders of the EU, NATO, the Western European Union, and the European Parliament he had met had emphasized that they should settle their relations with neighboring Hungary—otherwise they would not be admitted to the EU. Therefore, this requirement applies equally to all of us. The western part of Europe is interested in stability in the central and eastern part. Regardless of the accession, the EU would like to see stable conditions developing in this region. It might sound dramatic but they would not like to see more Bosnias in this region. That is one of the reasons they are urging the settlement of relations.

[Barat] In Strasbourg, together with Romanian Foreign Minister Melescanu, you signed the Council of Europe's national minority protection document. You also held talks with Melescanu on the Hungarian-Romanian basic treaty. Are you optimistic?

[Kovacs] A four-party coalition government is operating in Romania and, as I was told by the representatives of the leading government party, they are dependent on the support of the other three parties, whose leading politicians are conducting a campaign against the Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania [RMDSZ—in Romanian: UDMR] and the Hungarians in general. In Strasbourg, at all forums of the Council of Europe, I—and

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Melescanu, too—was told that the attacks on the RMDSZ do at least as much harm to Romania's international image as to Hungarian-Romanian relations.

[Barat] On the basis of all this, do you believe it possible now to improve our relations with Romania and effect a basic treaty?

[Kovacs] Melescanu suggested that we speed up the talks on the basic treaty so that the documents can be signed by mid-March at the level of prime ministers. In reaction to this, I said we would be happy if this could be accomplished. However, the Romanian Government—rather than Hungary—has to take the appropriate steps to achieve this.

[Barat] The results of Horn's and Meciar's meeting in Budapest drew a large response. Completely different, even diametrically opposed statements were published on these results. One of these was that Meciar had actually tricked the Hungarian prime minister in connection with the water barrage system because the Hungarian side accepted an obligation to build a weir that, in the view of the environmentalists, serves only Slovakia's interests.

[Kovacs] I am convinced that the agreements are at least as much in Hungary's interest as in Slovakia's. I do not share the view of certain militant environmentalist organizations that the worse it is, the better and that we should let the Szigetkoz area [northwestern Hungary] be completely destroyed simply because The Hague court could then issue a decision in favor of Hungary. People should realize that The Hague court will not be moved by the sight of the dried-up Szigetkoz. In my view, the Hungarian Government does have an obligation to do all it can to lessen the damage while not threatening our positions in The Hague. We laid it down in a separate document that this temporary agreement cannot affect the position of the two sides in The Hague.

[Barat] Hungary's goal was to complete the basic treaty with at least one of our neighbors by 21 March.

[Kovacs] We will have handed over a new, revised draft to the Slovak side by the time this interview is published. In my view, the Hungarian-Slovak basic treaty has a good chance of being completed in time.

Expert Views Chances of Conciliation With Romania

AU1002143195 Budapest MAGYAR NEMZET in Hungarian 9 Feb 95 p 11

[Interview with Mihaly Fulop, deputy general director of the Foreign Affairs Institute, by "p.l."; place and date not given: "In Romanian Domestic Politics, for True Conciliation, Clarification Is Essential"]

[FBIS Translated Text] We interviewed Mihaly Fulop on the current situation and prospects of Romanian-Hungarian relations.

[MAGYAR NEMZET] In your view, can the swaying of Romanian politics concerning Hungary and the campaign launched in recent weeks against the Hungarians and the Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania [RMDSZ—in Romanian: UDMR] be attributed to domestic or foreign political reasons?

[Fulop] In my view, there are both domestic and foreign political reasons for this. The point is that Romania will have parliamentary and presidential elections in autumn 1996, and it has been more or less decided by now that the Social Democracy Party of Romania, which has a 34 percent share in the parliament, will open up toward nationalist forces rather than the Democratic Convention. The nationalist forces are even now handing in the bill for their cooperation.

However, this issue also has a foreign political aspect. Romania has consolidated its foreign political situation in all kinds of European Union documents—and it is comparable to the four Visegrad countries, as a country in the same category. On the basis of this, it was concluded that they can publicly and officially accept the alliance with the national forces because this does not present such a big risk that it would endanger Romania's foreign assessment before signing the stability agreement in March. Parallel to this, in recent months, Romanian diplomacy has very skillfully done everything it could to present, for example, the issue of the Hungarian-Romanian bilateral treaty in such a way that, on their part, they are acting in accordance with European norms and the stability agreement both as regards the border issue and the national minority issues, and should the basic treaty not be signed by 21 March, this will be only because of the Hungarian side.

[MAGYAR NEMZET] In this situation, what can be expected from the basic treaty if they actually manage to complete it?

[Fulop] In my view, at the expert talks on the basic treaty, on the issues that are most important for us—such as including the national minority paragraph in the basic treaty or signing a separate agreement on the protection of national minorities together with the basic treaty—the progress necessary to enable initialing the basic treaty by 21 March has not been made. We must make our foreign partners understand that the signing of the agreement does not depend on us. In my view, both sides are trying to prove to the EU member-states that "the other is the culprit" in this matter. The already mentioned Romanian domestic political turmoil is inseparable from all this, because it is perfectly clear that President Iliescu and the government party supporting him are playing a strange game. He is trying to take the wind out of the national forces' sails; at the same time, he is trying to present the situation in such a way that, in spite of this, Bucharest is willing to "make peace" with neighboring Hungary. This is an inner contradiction that basically stems from Romanian domestic politics. In my view, Romanian domestic politics, and especially the

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atmosphere of attacks on Romanian-Hungarian national minority policy and interest-protection organizations do not leave room for the two sides to make progress toward signing the basic treaty.

[MAGYAR NEMZET] You mentioned that Romanian diplomacy has conducted an extremely clever policy recently. As a historian and researcher, what foreign policy steps do you recommend that the Hungarian Government take regarding Romania?

[Fulop] For our part, we must do all we can to show that Hungary's main foreign political goal is accession to the European organizations, the EU and NATO. Hungary meets all the conditions—political, economic, and military—that will assist in achieving this goal. At the same time, we must also demonstrate that Hungary wishes to live in peace and good-neighborly relations with its neighbors, and that admitting the country to the EU will not also mean admitting border and national minority problems. At the same time, Hungarian foreign policy must build a trusting relationship with the Hungarian organizations abroad that will make it clear to them that Hungary's EU membership is also in their interest. These organizations have to understand, on the basis of this trust, that the Hungarian Government does all it can to assert the principles of national minority protection in interstate relations.

[MAGYAR NEMZET] After all this, what do you predict for future bilateral relations? Will there be a historical conciliation?

[Fulop] I feel that a historical conciliation will be facilitated only by a new "configuration" in the Romanian domestic political power structure. The current one can remain in force until the elections in autumn of 1996. The strongest governing party and Iliescu will probably continue to make concessions to the nationalist forces.

In this political arena, it is very difficult to establish the elements of a spiritual conciliation that could further the cause of conciliation. It will have a chance only if Romanian domestic politics rejects this situation and starts off on the road of clarification—which I do not expect before autumn of 1996. To achieve this, it is also necessary for the Romanian opposition to understand that representing national viewpoints cannot mean abandoning democratic principles, and cannot mean that it should not defend the RMDSZ, because the attacks might also endanger the opposition's position.

As far as Hungary is concerned, I cannot see any domestic or foreign political obstacles to the process of conciliation. Most importantly, Romania's domestic situation must be settled before real conciliation can begin.

SZDSZ 'Optimistic' About Government Activity

AU1402084095 Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian 11 Feb 95 pp 1, 7

[Interview with SZDSZ Chairman Ivan Peto by Attila Zsoldos; place and date not given: "A Change Is Needed in the Coalition Activity"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Passage omitted] [Zsoldos] After Laszlo Bekesi's resignation, the leaders of the Alliance of Free Democrats [SZDSZ] sounded the alarm by saying that the coalition has arrived at a borderline. Have you changed your evaluation following the recent nomination of Gyorgy Suranyi and Lajos Bokros?

[Peto] The situation has changed. The best possible solution has been achieved by nominating two people who meet all the previous criteria set by the SZDSZ. Perhaps this is the government's last chance to carry out its own program. Of course, there are still serious personnel decisions to be made, such as the nomination of a privatization minister and a cultural ministry political state secretary. At the moment, we can only hope that, cooperating with the new president of the Hungarian National Bank, the new finance minister will indeed be able to solve the tasks that Laszlo Bekesi failed to solve. The hope is there. [passage omitted]

[Zsoldos] Since you formed a coalition with the Hungarian Socialist Party [MSZP], the SZDSZ has been the government's most critical opponent. There are people who explain this by saying that the SZDSZ is frustrated, from this cooperation. Have you ever thought that it was a mistake to accept the MSZP's offer to form a coalition?

[Peto] No, because I said at the beginning that the coalition is only an opportunity and it is not certain that the opportunity will become reality. A government that enjoys a parliamentary majority of more than 70 percent has the opportunity to stabilize the situation and solve the economic problem in a very difficult situation, by also accepting serious conflicts. I still think that the opportunity was there, and it is still there. Moreover, the current situation resembles the period when we signed the coalition agreement. The opportunity has again emerged now, with the nomination of the new finance minister and the new president of the Hungarian National Bank. That the government will be able to make use of this opportunity is not certain, but I hope it will. [passage omitted]

[Zsoldos] What do SZDSZ members think about the past six months?

[Peto] The opinions within the SZDSZ are rather uniform. Obviously, there must be exceptions too, but I am not aware of any demand to immediately abolish the coalition. Nor am I aware of any opinion according to which the coalition functions the way we envisaged and the implementation of the government program advances at the speed we hoped it would. The general opinion prevailing after Bekesi's resignation was that the SZDSZ can no longer accept government responsibility if no change takes place in the functioning of the coalition. However, it is still too early for me to be able to sum up my opinions after the nomination of Suranyi and Bokros, but it seems that the SZDSZ members see the current situation as a new chance.

[Zsoldos] Do you agree with the opinion that the confidence of the two coalition parties in each other has decreased since the new government took office?

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[Peto] I do not agree with this. In my view, the trust between the SZDSZ and the MSZP [Hungarian Socialist Party] has generally grown stronger. There are places where lack of trust increased, but this is not a general phenomenon. [passage omitted]

[Zsoldos] One cannot avoid the question: Is it true that your personal relations with Gyula Horn are not quite cloudless?

[Peto] It would be useless to deny the tension that exists between us. The decisionmaking mechanisms of the two parties are quite different and, given the fact that Gyula Horn is the MSZP chairman and I am the chairman of the SZDSZ, the tension between us partially emerged irrespective of our personality. My sovereignty in the SZDSZ is much smaller than Gyula Horn's sovereignty in his own party. In the SZDSZ, the position of the party on many issues is determined by the executive body that meets every week. It is a fact, however, that the tension between us also derives from our different mentality. I have a different idea about the functioning of the coalition. This has become clear in recent months. However, I do not have personal emotions that might hinder my cooperation with the prime minister. [passage omitted]

FIDESZ Censures Position on Nuclear Plant

LD1402102295 Budapest MTV Television Network in Hungarian 0600 GMT 14 Feb 95

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] The Federation of Young Democrats [FIDESZ] is seriously raising the responsibility of the Ministry of Environment in connection with the Mochovce nuclear plant. This was said by Jozsef Szajer, head of the deputies group, at a FIDESZ press briefing in the parliament. According to the FIDESZ deputy group's positiion on the Slovak nuclear plant under construction, it is to our country's shame that the possible effects of the power station have not been dealt with.

The head of the deputies group called the ministry's attitude toward the issue untenable. Jozsef Szajer tried to illustrate this attitude as follows: We cannot achieve anything, therefore it is not worth doing anything. [passage omitted]

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Oleksy, Walesa Disagree on Presidential Ministries

LD1402122795 Warsaw PAP in Polish 1122 GMT 14 Feb 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Warsaw, 14 Feb—Sejm Speaker Jozef Oleksy told journalists today that during a telephone conversation he failed to reach agreement with President Lech Walesa about the appointment of ministers in the so-called presidential ministries [National Defense Ministry, Foreign Ministry, Internal Affairs Ministry]. Oleksy added that he will make a final decision on the mission of forming the new government later today.

The speaker said that during today's coalition meeting the issue of how to resolve the problem of appointing ministers in the three ministries will be discussed.

Daily Says Walesa May Obstruct Cabinet Formation

WS1402124895 Warsaw GAZETA WYBORCZA in Polish 13 Feb 95 p 1

[Article by "dom," "knysz," "wz": "Clouds Over Oleksy"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *Will the president obstruct Oleksy in the formation of the government? Belweder Ministers Falandysz and Zakrzewski often mention a new governing coalition: the Democratic Left Alliance [SLD] with the Freedom Union [UW] and the Union of Labor [UP].*

Lech Walesa remains reserved as to the mission Speaker Jozef Oleksy has to carry out as the new prime minister. "I am not going to veto, but I cannot say I am pleased," he said immediately after the coalition announced its decision to replace Waldemar Pawlak with Oleksy.

Not the Right Prime Minister

"Walesa wanted to overthrow Pawlak's cabinet. But he did not want any of the leaders of the Social Democracy of the Polish Republic, formerly the Polish United Workers' Party, to form the next government," say the president's advisers. "His dream was to overthrow a postcommunist government, and the variant with Oleksy does not fulfill that dream."

The Belweder does not believe the speaker will succeed. "It will be difficult for him to reach an agreement with Walesa on the issue of the three presidential ministries," says our interlocutor at the Belweder. "Besides, Oleksy and the SLD will not reach agreement with the Polish Peasant Party [PSL]," he adds.

Not the Right Coalition

Walesa wants to change the coalition. "It is high time we found out whether the alliance between the SLD and the PSL is the only probable one. I believe there are other possibilities," says Belweder Minister Andrzej Zakrzewski.

The president's associates claim that neither the prime minister nor the coalition has passed the test over the last year and a half in power. Pawlak's downfall thus provides an opportunity to change not only the ministers, but the coalition as well—for example, a government formed by the SLD, UW, and UP.

"The PSL is too tired and worn," Professor Lech Falandysz told Radio "ZET" yesterday.

For the time being, both unions reject the president's concept of a new coalition.

Tadeusz Mazowiecki [UW]: "I think it is impossible for UW and the SLD to form a joint government at the moment, yet I am aware Walesa would be very pleased with such a configuration. He could then criticize it when he runs in the elections as head of the rightist camp."

Tomasz Nalecz [UP]: "I do not see any chances of forming a coalition between the SLD, UW, and UP. In making that suggestion the president wants to line up his main opponents in the presidential campaign. Among them are politicians from these very parties (Kuron and Kwasniewski—ed.). Walesa wants a government formed by the SLD, UW, and UP to emerge only so he can later say the Roundtable setup has reemerged and contend with it."

Walesa Will Not Approve a Government?

Falandysz: "Unless an SLD-UW coalition forms, the dissolution of the Sejm remains possible and even probable."

Zakrzewski continues: "If the president does not consent to the candidates nominated by Oleksy, Lech Walesa might not approve the government."

Experts on Constitutional law claim that the president has no right to refuse to approve the government, but Prof. Falandysz disagrees. No one can settle this dispute because the Constitutional Tribunal does not interpret the Constitution.

In Case Oleksy Fails

"Jozef Oleksy's cabinet is a last-ditch government," an SLD leader told us yesterday. "If it proves impossible to appoint one, the Sejm will dissolve. The coalition would thus call for premature parliamentary elections so as to preclude Walesa's attacks and lose as few points as possible before election day."

If Oleksy fails, UW will probably come forth with a motion for a no-confidence vote in Pawlak's government. Apart from the opposition, one of the coalition parties must support it if the motion is to pass. Our interlocutor from the SLD claims that his party would be willing to lend that support. Premature parliamentary elections are becoming ever more likely.

Walesa admits that he has no legal means of dissolving parliament right now. He said so on WIADOMOSCI [main television newscast] yesterday. If, however, there were such a possibility, the president would most probably use it to lead to premature parliamentary elections and delay the presidential ones. He alluded to this very

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clearly yesterday when he said that the two elections should not take place at the same time because they might "overlap."

Oleksy: Government To Continue Pawlak Policies

LD1302125995 Warsaw Radio Warszawa Network in Polish 1105 GMT 13 Feb 95

[FBIS Translated Text] The ruling coalition is expected to begin talks this afternoon on forming a new government. The Democratic Left Alliance [SLD] and the Polish Peasant Party [PSL] leaders will discuss the scope of a planned reform of the administration center and candidates for ministerial posts. Jozef Oleksy will probably decide tomorrow if he will accept the mission to form a new government.

Today, Oleksy said that the future SLD-PSL government will be, as he put it, a government that continues the policies of Waldemar Pawlak's Cabinet.

[Reporter Andrzej Kruszynski] Jozef Oleksy shared this view with journalists and added that the Pawlak government has not spoiled anything, but it has consolidated growing trends in the economy. The speaker said that the new government will not mean, as some want, a revolutionary turn. Oleksy is optimistic about agreement between the president and the coalition on a candidate for the post of defense minister.

A coalition meeting will probably begin at 1700 today.

Daily Predicts Oleksy Government Weak, Vulnerable

WS1302142595 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 11-12 Feb 95 p 2

[Article by Kazimierz Groblewski: "Lech Walesa Can Do More"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The president can have a rest. "He did not object" to the candidacy of Jozef Oleksy for the head of the new government, which means that his action was constructive. He seized this opportunity to extend his powers. In addition, the situation appears to be a good omen for him and the future. The Pawlak Cabinet is close to stepping down. The president is certainly pleased.

Many people suspect that President Walesa has agreed that Oleksy form his government only because he wants to attack it in a few months' time. The Democratic Left Alliance [SLD] also feels such fears, and even Sejm Speaker Oleksy might feel them.

The facts are as follows: The next day after agreements were reached by the SLD and the Polish Peasant Party [PSL], the president's spokesman reported that the president did not raise any objections. However, when on 9 February Lech Walesa was asked about his attitude toward Oleksy's candidacy, he equivocated. He said that he would prefer a woman as prime minister; he added that he could not answer whether he liked the concept of Oleksy as prime minister. This means that he does not yet know himself how he wants to react, or he does not want to say too much; he prefers to not give his backing or offer any criticism.

Unfortunately, it is still unknown exactly what the president and the Sejm speaker said to each other during their meeting on 9 February. One can only get the impression that now the speaker does not want to become prime minister as much as he wanted to initially. The statement that he is still not convinced whether he will undertake the mission of forming a new government came after his meeting with the president. One cannot help suspect that it is after this meeting that he became more doubtful.

It is not certain what the president's real plans are as far as a future government formed by Oleksy are concerned—if he successfully forms it, of course. At any rate, Lech Walesa has enough reason to feel really good. His attack did not end up in anything, even though it could have. Now the president can take a deep breath before further developments. He can wait and watch the results of what he has done. The next move must be made by the coalition.

Nonetheless, Lech Walesa has not shot all of his bullets yet. The budget is lying on the desk of the Constitutional Tribunal. In line with the small constitution, new ministers are appointed by the president. He will have to appoint ministers in three ministries: Foreign Affairs, National Defense, and Internal Affairs. These are areas where Lech Walesa can operate, where he can show his goodwill and willingness for compromise or not.

A lot seems to show that, if Jozef Oleksy does form a government, it will be a weak cabinet. It is being established in a difficult situation; politicians are tired of the war with the president. The threat of dissolving parliament and speeding up the election date, which was made only once, will keep coming back. The successful recall of the PSL-SLD government will tempt the president to put this scenario into effect once again. This temptation will be even more irresistible if public opinion surveys show that Walesa's popularity increased after his recent moves.

It will probably be a weak government also because cooperation between the coalition partners may not develop very well. The new cabinet may not have enough strength because its only locomotive may be the SLD, which will badly need a success. The PSL will resent the fact that the SLD contributed to the downfall of the Pawlak Cabinet. Its ambition will be hurt, and it will have a feeling of defeat because its own prime minister has been recalled and because it must be in a government headed by someone from the SLD. The complex of being a satellite party may become noticeable.

Therefore, the government that is formed (if it is formed) will be an easy target of attacks. If Lech Walesa starts

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doing this, the PSL is bound to overtly or covertly support him; it will at least partially improve its mood if Oleksy's government winds up where its own prime minister did.

Apart from that, Oleksy's cabinet will be very specially dependent on the president. Walesa will be the father of this government because it has been formed at his evident demand.

The president has other reasons to be satisfied as well. He has extended his powers once again. At this stage, government formation is none of his business. Nevertheless, the Sejm speaker did go to the Belweder to sound out the president.

Walesa Spokesman Protests Wilecki Report

WS1302160195 Warsaw GAZETA WYBORCZA in Polish 11-12 Feb 95 p 4

[Letter from Presidential Spokesman Leszek Spalinski to Adam Michnik, editor in chief of GAZETA WYBORCZA, followed by a reply from Ernest Skalski, GAZETA WYBORCZA deputy editor in chief]

[FBIS Translated Text] Mr. Adam Michnik, editor in chief of GAZETA WYBORCZA

Dear Sir.

With due respect for the right journalists hold to freely interpret and comment on current affairs, I must protest against some of the practices of your paper.

GAZETA WYBORCZA has taken the lead in speculating on current developments in Poland. The common denominator in these speculations is painting the role of the president of the Republic of Poland in the blackest of colors.

The entire issue would not even be worth a second thought were your paper a gutter tabloid. Unfortunately, the items appear in a huge nationwide daily. A daily that is viewed by the public and politicians alike as a serious paper. Creating accomplished facts that cause public chaos and confusion among the top decisionmaking authorities and that instigate a sinister reality do not serve anyone, least of all peace and stability in the country.

These are the only terms I find to comment on a bizarre text GAZETA flashed on its front page on 6 February—"Walesa's General Variant." I hope that in the future, journalists and the Editorial Board at GAZETA WYBORCZA will consider whether it is more important to chase scandals to net higher profits or to retain thoughtfulness and common sense in interpreting real events, especially as the speculations are completely groundless and pertain to the most important issues for our nation.

I realize that someone might not like the president. One may also speculate as to future developments. But speculation should be based on fact. Your paper accuses others of heating up the atmosphere. What other aim did you pursue by confounding some and frightening others with military rule? Publishing such items causes your appeals for peace and calm to ring false. What is GAZETA WYBORCZA's true philosophy?

With kindest regards,
Leszek Spalinski

* * *

Before writing his letter, Mr. Leszek Spalinski could have checked which of the president's closest associates had heard of plans to appoint General Wilecki head of government. If two reputable people close to the president tell us the same story, independently of one another, it unquestionably becomes a press fact that we are obliged to report to our readers, even if we warn our readers from the very first lines that the story might not be true or that it could be a premeditated leak that was to frighten the Sejm or raise a public response on such an idea.

We received the report on Sunday, 5 February. We published it in our Monday edition. On Friday, 3 February, at approximately 1300, when the president had already landed in Gdansk, journalists asked him whether it was true that Gen. Wilecki was to replace Pawlak. DZIENNIK BALTYCKI wrote about this on Saturday and SUPEREXPRESS—on Monday.

Walesa joked his way out of the question, but the question proves someone had already heard of the project. Together with the information we received on Sunday, the whole issue became more serious.

President Walesa's close ties to Gen. Wilecki are undeniable. When President Walesa told the generals "You are the best sons of this land," he revealed his political philosophy.

Why would the idea of appointing Gen. Wilecki prime minister strike anyone as more absurd than appointing General Andracki a member of the National Radio and Television Council?

The task of any paper is to gather information and publish it when important. When a high official at the President's Chancellery claims the Sejm might be dissolved, the press has a duty to analyze all of the probable scenarios and forewarn the public of the consequences.

Daily Tracks Waning Support for Pawlak Cabinet

WS1402114595 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 11-12 Feb 95 pp 1-2

[Article by Renata Wrobel: "Closing Balance of Pawlak Cabinet"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Regardless of what decisions are made over the next few days or weeks of who is finally entrusted with the mission of forming a new government and which people assume portfolios in it, one thing is certain: The time of the old composition of Prime Minister Waldemar Pawlak's government is over. Public opinion

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surveys show that the "closing balance" of both the government and its head can hardly be called favorable.

Michal Strak, head of the Office of the Council of Ministers, speaking on Radio "Zet" on 10 February, said that one of the positive things about the Pawlak Cabinet is the fact that it has been forced to step down not because of public dissatisfaction but because of conflicts between centers of authority. Indeed, people did not come out in the streets and demand that the government resign. Public opinion polls, however, which are the most available "everyday" form of observing public moods, show that not only the president has a bad opinion on the work of government. The grades given to the government and the prime minister have deteriorated dramatically since the 1993 elections, which swept the coalition of the Democratic Left Alliance and the Polish Peasant Party to power.

From Enthusiasm to Criticism

In the fall of 1993, Poles welcomed the Pawlak government enthusiastically, if we take into account our Polish reality. People who considered themselves supporters of the government (in line with opinion polls carried out by the Public Opinion Research Center—CBOS) constituted 60 percent of respondents; only 20 percent were indifferent, and merely 10 percent said that they were opponents of the new government.

Such a result has never been noted again since. As early as January of the following year, 1994, less than 50 percent of respondents declared support for the government; 20 percent stated that they were opponents of the government. From March to July last year, supporters of the government constituted between 30 and 40 percent of respondents. Opponents always exceeded 20 percent.

Beginning in September, the number of respondents favorably disposed toward the government usually dropped below 30 percent. In the last two months of the year, people who did not support the cabinet were more numerous than those who praised it.

The CBOS research carried out in January this year showed a certain improvement in the government's rating—the diagrams presenting the number of opponents of the cabinet, its supporters, and people indifferent to it almost converged in one spot. However, researchers hastened to provide an explanation which was not very favorable to the government; they explained that this slight increase in the number of government supporters resulted, among other things, from the fact that "people usually had higher incomes at the end of the year."

Proof showing that the work of government has recently been evaluated as very poor by Poles can be one of the opinion polls conducted by Demoskop. No one gave very good grades; good grades were given by 18 percent, and bad grades—70 percent. For the first time in the monthly surveys conducted by this agency, the worst grades were given not to the president, but to the government.

CBOS experts determined that the fundamental issue that supporters and opponents of the government differ on is the evaluation of economic policy, as well as the evaluation of the prime minister himself.

Prime Minister and His Government

The opinions of Waldemar Pawlak expressed by the average respondent became increasingly less positive. In the aforementioned January poll by Demoskop, the percentage of people who believed that the prime minister was not performing his duty well enough reached 62 percent, whereas only a month before these respondents constituted 54 percent. In addition, the number of people who were convinced that the head of government was doing a good job steadily decreased.

On the commission of RZECZPOSPOLITA, every month the Sopot-based Public Opinion Research Institute [PBS] asked Poles whether they approved of Waldemar Pawlak's performance in office. A miracle such as "a well-evaluated prime minister of a poorly evaluated government" did not occur. From January last year to January this year the percentage of people who did not approve of decisions made by Prime Minister Pawlak doubled (from 27 to 58 percent). Those who accepted the prime minister's activity have recently been 1.5 times less numerous than they were a year ago (a drop from 38 to 26 percent). Since autumn, opponents have been evidently more numerous than supporters, and most of those who were earlier undecided have joined the ranks of the dissatisfied.

The events that took place in late January and early February dramatically changed the opinions of Poles regarding the sensibility of Waldemar Pawlak's remaining in office as prime minister. As recently as the end of January, 47 percent of respondents preferred the government to be headed by Pawlak rather than someone else; 30 percent were in favor of a change. Early in February, when the president's unclear plans to dissolve the parliament had turned into a real threat (it was already after the stormy meeting between Lech Walesa and the Council of Elders), as many as 52 percent of respondents wanted the prime minister to go; every third respondent preferred him to stay in office.

Suchocka Left With Better Results

In line with data collected by CBOS in January, 44 percent of Poles evaluated as poor the results achieved by the government headed by Waldemar Pawlak. Only 37 percent of respondents expressed favorable opinions. This government received the highest grades for its work a few months after it was established, which was in April last year (those who praised the government constituted almost 50 percent at that time).

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The balance of the previous government, headed by Hanna Suchocka, was slightly better at the end of its political life (September 1993). Its accomplishments were criticized by 39 percent of respondents, whereas they were praised by 40 percent. It is worth recalling that this happened after the several-month period when the government had been recalled by the Sejm and was awaiting the results of the new elections to finally relinquish power.

* * *

The author used, among others, the monthly PBS polls conducted for RZECZPOSPOLITA, the last one dating from 21-22 January of this year, carried out on a 1,000-person sample representative for adult residents of Poland; monthly CBOS polls, the last one from 6-9 January this year, carried out on a 1,230-person random sample of adult inhabitants of Poland; CBOS poll for GAZETA WYBORCZA of 3-6 February this year, carried out on a 1,217-person random representative sample of adult residents of Poland; Demoskop poll of 12-17 January this year, carried out on a 946-person random-quantity sample of Poland's residents of at least 15 years of age.

SLD, PSL Agree on Program Aims for New Government

LD1302212195 Warsaw TVP Television Second Program Network in Polish 2000 GMT 13 Feb 95

[FBIS Translated Text] [Announcer] The Polish Peasant Party [PSL]-Democratic Left Alliance [SLD] coalition has agreed on the main program aims for a new government. The candidate for prime minister, Speaker Jozef Oleksy, has not yet decided whether he will undertake the mission of forming a government.

[Unidentified correspondent] Before the talks with the Peasant Party, SLD politicians held talks among themselves.

[Begin recording] [Oleksy] We discussed the entirety of the concept, as regards the new government, on the part of the SLD.

[Correspondent] Are you closer to a decision?

[Oleksy] It is conditional not only on the stance of the members of the coalition.

[Correspondent] One condition put forward by Speaker Oleksy is the entry into force of the budget law for this year. The SLD proposed a change in the construction of the cabinet through the implementation of a reform of the central economic administration.

[Adam Struzik, PSL] A proposal has been presented. We must analyze it, and we will address it tomorrow.

[Correspondent] Today, the coalition agreed five [as heard] main aims for the new government. These are: the continuation of economic growth through activities based upon the "Strategy for Poland"; further reforms of the public administration and the strengthening of local government; reforms of social welfare policy; the increase of the security of citizens; changes in the legal system; active efforts aimed at the integration of Poland with European structures. Over and above this, the sides accepted the principles of information policy and also the method of its internal functioning.

[Jerzy Szmajdzinski, SLD] This constitutes an acceptance of the functioning of a government press spokesman, with all that this entails. [end recording]

[Correspondent] Coalition politicians are of the view that the completion of consultations will be possible in the course of the next few days.

[Announcer] Talks about the coalition will be continued tomorrow, and there will probably be an agreement on the full text and also the appendixes of a new coalition agreement. Only then will the agreement of the composition of the government begin and the candidate for prime minister decide whether to undertake the mission of forming a new government.

SDL Head Sees Possible Broader-Based Government

AU1302140295 Sofia DUMA in Bulgarian 10 Feb 95 pp 1, 3

[Interview with Aleksandr Kwasniewski, chairman of the Democratic Left Alliance, by Boris Dankov in Warsaw; date not given: "We Do Not Exclude Broadening the Basis of the Government"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Dankov] The Polish left has been ruling the country for more than a year now. What changes have ensued during this period?

[Kwasniewski] Our party does not rule alone but participates in governing the country. The Democratic Left Alliance [SDL] is represented in the largest factions in both chambers of parliament and forms part of the largest parliamentary coalition. We are striving not to diverge drastically from the policies followed by previous cabinets. We follow the principle "As much continuity as necessary; as many changes as are possible." Our principal aim is to lessen the social cost of transforming the economy and win public support for the reforms.

[Dankov] How do you assess the results of this past period?

[Kwasniewski] One of our coalition's undoubted achievements that we should mention is the consolidation of the positive trends in the economy. In 1994 the economy grew by about 4.5 percent. We managed to bring down the annual inflation rate by 9 percent, although it is still high and exceeds 29 percent. For the first time since 1989, unemployment fell, and the country's foreign debt was also significantly reduced.

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As a further success of ours, we can cite the increased cooperation with the European Union and NATO. The events of the past few months have certainly brought us nearer to negotiations on Poland being accepted into these organizations.

However, I also think that during this period certain weaknesses have become apparent in the government's work and in the internal coordination within our coalition.

[Dankov] It is known that differences exist between the SDL and the Polish Peasant Party. Are these serious?

[Kwasniewski] Naturally, difficult debates are going on within the coalition. Our partners represent the quite specific interests of the private farmers. In some instances, they are conservative and distrustful toward the West and the Euro-Atlantic structures. This has sometimes led to difficult conversations regarding the rate of modernization in the country and economic and foreign policy. These differences are the result of certain decisions that the former prime minister adopted too late. We believe that the coalition needs a new impetus, while the government needs personnel changes to impart more dynamism to its actions.

[Dankov] How much support does Waldemar Pawlak's cabinet have?

[Kwasniewski] As a result of the prime minister's inconsistent approach to certain problems, the government has lost some public support. The SDL is not withdrawing its support for the coalition, but we want substantial changes in the way it operates. The leaderships of the two groups making up the coalition have agreed that a left politician should head the government—namely, Jozef Oleksi, who has been serving as Sejm marshal until now.

During the discussion within the coalition, it became known that the erstwhile prime minister Waldemar Pawlak had come into sharp conflict with President Walesa. Before this, Walesa had strongly supported Pawlak over a period of two to three years. The current conflict between them developed in quite dramatic circumstances.

[Dankov] Can you describe more precisely how the conflict with Walesa is manifesting itself?

[Kwasniewski] The president has been trying to get Prime Minister Pawlak removed, and he wants fundamental changes in the government. If his demands are not met, he threatens to dissolve parliament, which is unconstitutional. The left strongly opposes Lech Walesa's threats and his ultimatum.

However, we consider that changes are needed in the style and functioning of the government and also in its membership. The main reason for the president's conflict with parliament and the government is his immense desire to get elected for another term in office. The president's low rating in the public opinion polls is pushing him toward populist and demagogic actions.

[Dankov] Will you yourself run in the forthcoming presidential elections?

[Kwasniewski] I will probably decide in May whether to agree to stand as candidate of the left.

[Dankov] Will the democratic left remain in power until the end of this parliament?

[Kwasniewski] I will reiterate my previous comment, that the left does not govern alone. We advocate retaining the coalition provided we have a guarantee that the government will change its style and improve its effectiveness. If this does not happen, we do not exclude the possibility of a broader-based government.

Oleksy Meets Two Coalition Politicians

LD1302173695 Warsaw PAP in Polish 1413 GMT 13 Feb 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Warsaw, 13 Feb—On Monday afternoon, Sejm Speaker Jozef Oleksy received Wieslaw Kaczmarek, minister of ownership transformations, and Grzegorz Rydlewski, under secretary of state in the Office of the Council of Ministers. After the meeting they both told journalists that the meeting did not revolve around personnel issues connected with the formation of the government.

"We discussed issues that might concern the chairman of the Council of Ministers, when and if he is the chairman," Grzegorz Rydlewski said. He denied that he was a candidate for the post of head of the Council of Ministers' Office. "Currently there are no candidates; as far as I know, the Sejm speaker is not forming the government yet," he added.

"I tried to draw the speaker's attention to all of the issues that have recently been a success for the government, as well as to issues that could have been handled better, faster, and wiser. Just an informal conversation," Rydlewski said.

"We kept encouraging the speaker so he will not resign from the mission he was going to undertake. The speaker is thinking, searching, and asking. There were no personnel talks," Wieslaw Kaczmarek replied when asked if Jozef Oleksy had offered him a ministerial portfolio.

Rulewski Proposes SLD-PSL-UW Coalition

LD1302134695 Warsaw Radio Warszawa Network in Polish 1105 GMT 13 Feb 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Deputy Jan Rulewski has come out with a proposal to form a grand coalition including the Democratic Left Alliance [SLD], the Polish Peasant Party [PSL], and the Union of Freedom [UW]]. Jan Rulewski is of the opinion that this coalition would ensure the necessary stabilization, and, as he said, nobody outside parliament would be able to manipulate it.

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[Begin Rulewski recording] This grand coalition should be made up of at least three parties—the SLD, the PSL, and the UW. I think that, in spite of it spelling trouble, there will, in fact, be no trouble. The SLD-PSL coalition has appeared to be troublesome itself, as it entered the political scene with conflicting interests. To say it frankly, everybody wanted to achieve something for his own group. Because of the character of the UW and the absence of any conflict of interest, it would be able to separate these partners. Poland would gain a strong impulse for stability, and nobody would be able to play with this coalition, including Lech Walesa. [end recording]

UW deputy Jan Rulewski has some reservations about yesterday's resolution by his party national council, which provides for the formation of a government of experts above party politics and for the dissolution of parliament. According to him, above all, Poland, which already has a third parliament within five years, needs stability.

Politicians on Walesa's Division of Political Arena

WS1302142395 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 13 Feb 95 p 2

[Article by Kazimierz Groblewski: "Will Lech Walesa Divide or Unite?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The attitude toward President Walesa is where political groupings differ from one another. Even politicians of the same groupings differ here. Will the division of the political scene into those who are either in favor of or against Walesa grow deeper? Will Lech Walesa be the main factor dividing and uniting post-Solidarity groupings before the presidential elections? We asked several politicians about this very question.

Andrzej Anusz of the Secretariat of Center Rightist Groupings believes that Walesa realizes that, if he wants to win support, this is the right time. If one of his goals is to dissolve the parliament legally, some groupings will back him. In a few weeks' time, the situation may change to his disadvantage. Other official candidates for president will be put forward. Walesa is right now in a unique situation because he has a monopoly on the market of candidates. In some time he will lose his monopoly on creating the political scene. He will not have that much room for maneuvering. He will still have some chance, but it will be smaller.

Jerzy Eysymontt, former member of the Nonparty Bloc in Support of Reforms, right now in the newly established Republican Party, says: "It is possible that such a division will occur. However, I would not be satisfied. I do not think this would be very good for Poland, nor do I think such a division will result in creating something that would last long. What we should think about is not the time that will pass until the presidential or even parliamentary elections; we should think about the 21st century. We do not really feel like accepting only the convention of a boxing match. Despite all the sentiment and respect for Lech Walesa, we cannot consider such a criterion to be binding on our party. This does not exclude the possibility that we may find ourselves in some coalition."

"Walesa is a person who now divides not only groupings, but also politicians within the same parties," says Marek Jurek of the Christian-National Union. He is hoping, however, that this division will not grow deeper and that the groupings will finally reach an agreement—they will field a candidate who is a credible advocate of rightist principles and who is ready to defend them in difficult situations. "Lech Walesa does not satisfy this condition of credibility. For quite a long time during his presidency, he supported the return of postcommunist milieus."

Jan Rulewski of the Freedom Union [UW] believes that a situation in which attitudes toward Walesa would be the main factor setting parties at variance is impossible because "election clocks have already been set in motion, each in a separate room." This means that parties—UW, for instance—have already set the dates on which they will present their candidates. Most of the groupings that have not yet done this also reject Lech Walesa. Thus, it is not possible even if Lech Walesa were to change. Differences among post-Solidarity groupings are not decreasing, but increasing.

"I believe that already now the evaluation of Lech Walesa is a line of division among groupings. The fundamental issue that divides parties, however, is programmatic issues, but the vision of Poland," says Aleksander Hall of the Conservative Party. "Naturally, the forces that come from the post-August camp and do not want the old system to return and that at the same time do not object to the way Lech Walesa is performing his duties should seek agreement and close ranks. However, I believe that today, unless the situation changes dramatically, the negative scenario prevails—that is, the scenario that the groupings will go [to the elections] separately."

Rifkind Pleased With Walesa Statements on NATO

LD1302212095 Warsaw PAP in Polish 1952 GMT 13 Feb 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Warsaw, 13 Feb—Malcolm Rifkind, British secretary of state for defense, expressed his satisfaction this evening with President Lech Walesa's declarations that Poland was convinced about its NATO membership and that it was able to contribute its share to the security of the treaty as a whole and not just expect the strengthening of its own security.

"I believe this is a very positive approach to the issue of expansion of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization," Rifkind said at this evening's meeting with journalists.

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Rifkind said that, in considering the issue of its own expansion, NATO must look at individual expectations and the will to join of each country applying for membership and must assess capabilities for fulfilling the principles and methods of cooperation that are binding among NATO countries. "Nothing is automatic here. It is not that at one time we would accept a whole group of countries or not accept any of them," he stressed.

He said there is no direct threat to the security of NATO countries at the moment, but the task of the treaty is not just reacting to current threats but also ensuring long-term security for Europe.

"We do not have even one threat we faced during the Cold War period, but there are many possible scenarios, and many threats may still come to the surface—for example, from North Africa," Rifkind said, stressing that the treaty has currently friendly relations with Russia.

According to him, the conflict in Chechnya, although giving Western politicians something to think about, is having no direct influence on the issue of the expansion of NATO.

Asked to assess the political crisis in Poland, Rifkind said that in every healthy democracy such crises sometimes happen. In his opinion, friends of Poland understand that this does not constitute the weakening of Polish democracy.

"I hope these problems will be resolved as soon as possible," Rifkind said, adding that if such an uncertain situation persists it might, after all, exert a negative influence on foreign observers' perception of events that are taking place in Poland.

Minister: Serious Problems With Police Protest

LD1402100995 Warsaw Radio Warszawa Network in Polish 0900 GMT 14 Feb 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Interior Minister Andrzej Milczanowski has admitted that his department has serious problems with policemen's protests and with the vacant post of the chief commandant of police. Speaking on Polish Radio, Andrzej Milczanowski expressed surprise that Prime Minister Waldemar Pawlak has so far failed to appoint Jerzy Stanczyk to the post of chief commandant of police. According to the minister, further delaying the police chief's appointment is harmful to the interests of the state and the public.

The interior minister stated that the police are running short of almost everything, including operational technique and communications equipment, as well as the most basic equipment. Andrzej Milczanowski stressed that he has always been guided in his activities by the interests of the state and that, in his opinion, state officials should always act in the state interest rather than pursue political and personal interests.

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Daily Runs Three-Part Editorial on Funar

AU1402083495

[FBIS Editorial Report] Bucharest EVENIMENTUL ZILEI in Romanian on 8, 9, and 10 February carries on page 1 an editorial in three installments by the daily's director, Ion Cristoiu, entitled "The Conflict Between the Social Democracy Party of Romania [PDSR] and the Romanian National Unity Party [PUNR]." Part I, of 800 words, appears in EVENIMENTUL ZILEI of 8 February under the subheadline: "A Justified Hysteria" and talks about the "war between the PDSR and PUNR, triggered by the recent statements of PUNR President Gheorghe Funar," particularly by the "insulting" letters Funar sent to the "PDSR's idol at Cotroceni Presidential Palace," Ion Iliescu. The author adds that he was convinced from the start that this war "will have not any practical results." What happened was that Funar issued several "hazardous statements about eliminating the Hungarian minority in Romania, which both the PDSR leaders and President Iliescu considered unacceptable. Consequently, both the head of state and the leaders of the ruling party reacted immediately by calling Gheorghe Funar to order." The article says, further: However, unlike on similar occasions in the past, "this time, the reaction of the president and the PDSR leaders was marked by an obvious note of hysteria," with Iliescu going so far as to call Funar "a sick man." What caused all that hysteria? "Undoubtedly, the serious international resonance of the positions assumed by the PUNR leader. The article continues: The Romanians will wonder why the capitals of Europe and the world take the Cluj mayor [Funar] seriously, when they themselves have long since realized the circus value of his outbursts. The Romanians know that once the show is over, Gheorghe Funar will disappear behind the scenes, without leaving any trace behind."

EVENIMENTUL ZILEI of 9 February carries the 900-word Part II of the editorial under the subheadline: "Who Bears the Real Responsibility." The author emphasizes that "serious Western politicians cannot believe that a politician who is both mayor of a large city and the leader of a party can make such statements without trying to apply them in actual fact." The article goes on to say that "these politicians from abroad do not realize that, despite the fact that Gheorghe Funar is the leader of a government party, he has no power to influence the decisions of the executive branch" and they attach too much importance to his statements. Hence, the hysteria of the PDSR leaders, who see Funar's utterances as "jeopardizing Romania's integration into the European structures." But who is to blame for all that? "In these circumstances, the responsibility for the nefarious effects of Gheorghe Funar's stances on the Hungarian minority in Romania belongs to those who brought his party into the government coalition. That is, the responsibility rests with Ion Iliescu and the PDSR leaders. The Cluj mayor is entitled to issue violent statements against the Hungarian minority, since such statements are in perfect accordance with the platform that has brought him to the head of one of the most important cities, as well as with the platform of the PUNR." After reminding his readers that the PUNR joined the government through the protocol signed with the PDSR and the other coalition parties, Cristoiu says that "the PDSR leaders knew who they were dealing with when they signed that protocol. Normally, they should have categorically refused to ally themselves with a party flying the colors of extreme nationalism, if they wanted to be considered as rational politicians in the matter of minorities or if they wanted to be recognized by Europe. However, had they refused the PUNR requirement to join the government, the PDSR would have surely fallen from power. For the sake of staying in power, the PDSR allowed itself to enter an alliance with a party led by such an eccentric as Gheorghe Funar. Therefore, its thirst for power has clashed with the desire to be accepted by the Western chanceries." The PDSR only "got what it deserved," concludes the article.

The 1,200-word Part III of the editorial is published in EVENIMENTUL ZILEI of 10 February under the subheadline: "Winner by Points: Gheorghe Funar." Noting that the "coalition did not break up" after the 8 February meeting of the parties of the governmental arch, the editorial points out that "at the end of the meeting, the PDSR leaders tried hard to convince the press that they had emerged victorious in the clash with Gheorghe Funar, since, they claimed, the frenzied Cluj mayor was finally calmed down. However, the joy displayed by the ruling party should not lead us astray. The PDSR leaders were checkmated at the meeting that took place at Primaverii Palace. The winner by points remains Gheorghe Funar, since the main thing for him was to be perceived by his electorate in Cluj and Transylvania, for the duration of the scandal, as a steadfast leader who stands up to the Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania when the rest are ready to make concessions to the Hungarian devils." After all, "the party lives from violently anti-Hungarian gestures and statements in Gheorghe Funar's inimitable style. What would be left of the PUNR without him?" Therefore, it was not the PDSR leaders who "calmed Funar down," but rather Funar, who "beat them decisively." The three-part editorial winds up as follows: "After all, if one thinks properly, it was not Gheorghe Funar who beat them, but their own thirst for power."

Funar Calls For Cancellation of Atlanta Seminar

AU1402084295 Bucharest ROMANIA LIBERA in Romanian 9 Feb 95 p 3

[Article by Claudiu Harceaga: "Gheorghe Funar: We Will Ask For the Meeting in Atlanta To Be Canceled"]

[FBIS Translated Text] "Romania cannot accept that a meeting of the UDMR [Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania] with representatives of the Romanian leadership can be held in Atlanta. The country's president, and no one else, must mediate the dialogue. How

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can a certain Mr. Carter mediate the dialogue when he has no time to become informed about the problem? In what language is he going to address the participants? Moreover, people are greatly concerned that Jimmy Carter has only been sent to negotiate in areas affected by war. We will ask either for that meeting to be cancelled or for representatives of all 17 minorities in Romania to be sent to Atlanta," the controversial Gheorghe Funar said yesterday, 8 February. The PUNR [Romanian National Unity Party] leader also said that "this meeting is very dangerous because it is being financed by Hungarian irredentists and the UDMR leaders are already in Budapest getting their instructions." As one can see, Gheorghe Funar is not really making any effort to eliminate his obsessions....

Senator Calls Funar UDMR 'Spy' in PUNR

AU1402102695 Bucharest ROMANIA LIBERA in Romanian 9 Feb 95 p 3

[Unattributed report: "Viorel Salagean Sees the PUNR President as UDMR 'Spy' and 'Activist'"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Referring to the latest statements made by Gheorghe Funar, PUNR [Romanian National Unity Party] Senator Victor Salagean told AM PRESS the following: "The ultimatum is new evidence of political infantilism. What makes matters even worse is the fact that Gheorghe Funar speaks on behalf of the party. If the members of the Standing Committee do not take measures, in two weeks the PUNR will no longer exist. It will break up or disappear completely. There are several methods whereby this can be achieved. The most widely used method is, and will continue to be, that used by 'Caritas' [nationwide money-multiplying scheme]—namely, no one knows who has the lists or how he will use them. Therefore, many are afraid and do not understand that this is not the way to react to UDMR [Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania] declarations. Gheorghe Funar is the best party activist in the UDMR. I have suspected this for a long time. I can say that he is a UDMR spy implanted at the highest level of the PUNR."

Contradictory Statements Regarding Funar File

AU1402122695 Bucharest ADEVARUL in Romanian 8 Feb 95 p 1

[Article by Gyorgy Jakab: "The PDSR-PUNR Separation Will Be Achieved by Administrative Means—The File on Gheorghe Funar's Suspension Has Been Submitted to the Government"]

[FBIS Translated Text]

Cluj Prefect Grigore Zanc Accuses the Mayor of Serious Abuses and Illegal Acts

Grigore Zanc, Cluj County prefect and president of the PDSR's [Social Democracy Party of Romania] Cluj branch, has forwarded to the government's Local Public Administration Department a file that contains documentation on the illegal acts practiced by Cluj Mayor Gheorghe Funar. The major accusations included in the file are as follows: abusive decisions that ignore the law on local public administration; employing a much larger number of people in the Office of the Mayor than the government's scheme provides for; establishing local taxes illegally, before government regulations or a government decision had been issued; the association of the Office of the Mayor to various commercial firms ("There is property occupied by commercial firms associated with the Office of the Mayor that do not belong to the mayorship"); areas granted illegally to foreign commercial firms, etc.

Grigore Zanc also accuses the Court of Accounts of failing to do its duty. "One does not know how the associations can be justified, where the extrabudgetary sources have come from—and the situation of the mayorship's accounts is not known. In any event, these problems will be turned over to the Disputed Claims office," said the Cluj County prefect.

Editor's Note: Present at the PDSR news conference that was held yesterday, 8 February 1995, Octav Cozmanca, head of the Local Public Administration Department, said he has received only one letter, sent by several Cluj County councillors representing the Democratic Convention of Romania and the Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania, in which they request that Mayor Funar's activity be examined. Contradicting the declarations of his party colleague Grigore Zanc, Octav Cozmanca affirmed that he had "no knowledge of such a file."

PAC on CDR Restructuring, Liberal Union

AU1302143595 Bucharest CURIERUL NATIONAL in Romanian 6 Feb 95 p 1

[Unattributed article: "PAC Wishes To Restructure the CDR"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The PAC [Civic Alliance Party] met in Sinaia on 4 and 5 February and tasked the Steering Collegium with forwarding, by 15 February 1995, concrete proposals for the restructuring of the CDR [Democratic Convention of Romania] so as to thus enable it to win the 1996 elections, said PAC Leader Nicolae Manolescu in a declaration from the national convention.

If this action fails to get the expected response within the CDR, the PAC Steering Collegium will start discussions in its branches on this matter in order to decide whether it is advisable for the PAC to continue in the CDR. The final decision in this respect will be made at the 2d national PAC congress in May.

The Civic-Liberal Alliance is an important step toward liberal unification in Romania; however, the PAC national convention believes that a merger of the liberal parties into a single party is not opportune before the

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Alliance, which includes parties with a distinctive identity, can play the role for which it was set up.

The PAC national convention respects the rights of national minorities in accordance with international documents and Romania's constitution but rejects the claims of the UDMR [Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania] regarding territorial autonomy based on ethnic criteria.

Coposu Condemns Iliescu's 'Communist' Views

AU1002135295 Bucharest EXPRES MAGAZIN in Romanian 31 Jan-7 Feb 95 p 5

[Part II of interview with PNTCD Corneliu Coposu, National Peasant Christian-Democratic Party president, by Ileana Lucaciu; place and date not given: "I Wouldn't Have Imagined That Iliescu Could Be Such a Coward"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt]

Original Anarchy

[Lucaciu] Five years have passed since we experienced Iliescu's "original democracy"....

[Coposu] I have to interrupt you to make an observation—I believe that we are not referring to original democracy but original anarchy. As you know, I am not the one who came up with the statement that "every society gets the leaders it deserves." How could anyone ever have imagined a country where people vote for communists again. barely three months after shouting "No communists!" during a social explosion against a dictatorship that oppressed the thoughts and personality of citizens? These are unexplainable aberrations that we have experienced. And now we are victims of that blunder. [passage omitted]

[Lucaciu] In the past five years, have you noticed a change in Ion Iliescu?

[Coposu] He belongs to a group of people who cannot seem to let go of the Marxist-Leninist concept.

[Lucaciu] [Romanian political analyst] Silviu Brucan told me recently, referring to Ion Iliescu, that "one can expect no more from a Communist."

[Coposu] This is precisely my opinion as well. I do not dispute his desire to do something good for the country. He is trying, and not for personal gain but in the best interest of the community. However, because he cannot let go of the concept that he inherited, lived with, and in which he believes, his presence at the helm of the country is a disaster.

The idea that the humanistic ideals of communism—ideals in which he believes—were spoiled by Ceausescu, is harmful for Romania's present and future. Any person who still believes in the ideals of communism, even if you can respect him for his beliefs, represents an immense danger for the future of the country. Communism, I believe, was the most catastrophic calamity ever to befall, us and its harmful effects eclipsed even the consequences of two world wars. [passage omitted]

[Coposu] Iliescu is a communist and will die a communist. Despite his honesty and even his good will, he cannot escape from the concept he has lived with and in which he believes. Circumstances have forced him to accept that Romania is currently no longer able to find salvation in the East, and must turn to the West. He is striving to achieve the country's integration into the democratic institutions of the West. However, should it happen that—God forbid!—Communism makes a comeback in the former Soviet Union, or if the Chinese discover the fountain of youth and achieve a level of prosperity that affects the world economy, Iliescu's team would immediately turn to the East.

[Lucaciu] Do you think Iliescu is capable of obtaining a new mandate to the presidency?

[Coposu] It is very difficult to believe such a thing. No matter how much one underrates the intelligence of the voting masses, it is difficult to believe that with poverty engulfing Romania's population, this will not also have the effect of awakening them from the narcosis of 45 years of Communism.

[Lucaciu] It seems that eventually, the young people will be deciding the fate of the country. However, unfortunately, the great majority of our youth is affected by apathy. Many want to leave Romania as soon as possible. What opportunities do you see for young people in the future?

[Coposu] Unfortunately, the situation for our young people is depressing. I saw a statistical report on our young people's plans and realized with the greatest sorrow that 70 percent of young people's only goal is to leave the country. The endless perpetuation of a government that shows no interest in the younger generation increases the apathy of those who no longer see any hope for professional progress in their own country. However, this generation should realize that leaving the country is an act of cowardice and that they have a moral obligation to fight for their own future. By leaving, these young people will be lost to the Romanian nation. Very few of them will have a prosperous destiny; many of them will fail. My advice would be for young people to stay in Romania and be at the forefront of efforts to establish democracy and eradicate pseudocommunism. We believe we have done our duty to the country.

[Lucaciu] How does the PNTCD [National Peasant Christian-Democratic Party] perceive the problem of youth?

[Coposu] Within the party we are trying to promote the younger generation after a minimum period of training in politics. The PNTCD congress will be held this year, and in most areas, the older generation will hand over responsiblity to the younger generation. Even if the

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younger generation's training to occupy leading political functions is incomplete, age has a say in things, and one cannot cling to posts. There is a responsibility to prepare the future generation, and this is our current concern. We can blame destiny for the fact that we have no middle generation between the old ones who are about to leave and withdraw and the younger generation that is not yet trained. A dictatorial regime has destroyed the normal evolution of intelligence and competence. But this horrible history will never be repeated.

[Lucaciu] Can I assume that you are an optimist?

[Coposu] Yes, that is my nature. Somebody found one of my declarations referring to the first Soviet ultimatum, which I was certainly condemning. I said back then: "Our greatest enemy is the neighbor to the East and as long as the Soviet Union lasts, Romania will not be able to affirm its independence. But I know that my generation will still witness the fall of the Soviet Union." Then, later, in 1946, I was saying that eventually, communism would collapse on its own. Even during the most difficult moments in prison, I was sure I was going to escape and witness the collapse of communism.

Hence, today we are theoretically no longer a communist state, even if communists are still leading us. I am convinced that the current nightmare will endm and I foresee a good future for Romania soon, even if it is behind other former communist countries. The Romanian people are amazing, and there are enough examples in its history that confirm my statement. The Romanians will recover from the tragedy of this sad period.

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Sarajevo Reports U.S. Ambassador Denies Rumors

LD1202224995 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 2100 GMT 12 Feb 95

[FBIS Translated Text] U.S. Ambassador Victor Jackovich returned to Bosnia-Herzegovina a few days ago; he has denied many speculations about being replaced in his ambassadorial post. Ambassador Jackovich made the following statement for Bosnia-Herzegovina radio and television. We have a report by Vahida Rovcanin:

[Begin recording] [Jackovich] We are very concerned about the current situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina and in the entire area. We considered it was a good move forward when the agreement on the cessation of hostilities was signed. However, that has to be [words indistinct]. One has to take [word indistinct] into consideration because [words indistinct]. Not only is that cease-fire agreement not observed, but a genuine desire of one of the sides to do that has been brought into question.

The concrete implementation of the agreement is very difficult. I can only tell you that we are examining different options for the situation here, including more assistance to be given to the Federation, because we consider it to be an achievement [words indistinct] a meeting which we also attended was held with your government and the Bosnian Croats. The entire [words indistinct] federation to find a formula, because we keep talking about this (?active) federation. We have not been able to take concrete measures, concrete steps, in that direction until now. I think that with this meeting in Munich we have achieved just that.

We will offer assistance regarding the concrete current situation with the cessation of hostilities, at least in the short run; when it comes to midterm and long-term development of the situation in this area I think it will be very [word indistinct].

[Rovcanin] The four-month cessation of hostilities expires on 1 May; there has been no visible progress so far, as the aggressor side has refused to accept the Contact Group plan as the basis for the continuation of the negotiations. What will happen after the agreement expires on 1 May and if the situation remains the same?

[Jackovich] Several deadlines expire in April and May: the agreement on the cessation of hostilities and the deadline for the lifting of the embargo on arms exports to Bosnia-Herzegovina. Several dealines are to expire at the same time. We have several months to find a lasting solution. For a certain time people thought they could negotiate with Pale, that they could achieve something there. However, we all know that those who had attempted such a thing returned emptyhanded.

[Rovcanin] An initiative has been launched recently for a meeting between Presidents Izetbegovic, Tudjman, and Milosevic. What is the U.S. Administration's position on this?

[Jackovich] We accept this proposal, this initiative. However, we would like to see something tangible done prior to that. There have been many meetings, conferences, etc., on the Bosnian crisis. I believe it is high time to become aware of what we are getting into, if we are to have another conference. We should be able to have certain hopes for concrete results. For instance, when we are discussing the recognition of Bosnia-Herzegovina, we have to define precisely what recognition means. We have already seen that one side can sign something and then not honor it. Will this happen again and who will be in charge? Will this be some so-called Yugoslavia or the Serbs? As we have seen, Milosevic said: I do not acknowledge what Cosic and Panic have done.

We must clearly define recognition, and who will be in charge. There is a whole host of issues surrounding the conference to be resolved if the conference is to be successful. [end recording]

The Hague Tribunal Indicts 21 Bosnian Serbs

AU1302133795 Paris AFP in English 1318 GMT 13 Feb 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] The Hague, Feb 13 (AFP)—The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia on Monday indicted 21 Bosnian Serbs suspected of war crimes in ex-Yugoslavia, the tribunal's assistant prosecutor Graham Blewitt announced.

Blewitt, an Australian, said 19 of the suspects committed crimes against prisoners in the Omarska detention camp in northwest Bosnia and the two others committed atrocities at Omarska and other prison camps.

One of the suspects, Dusko Tadic, has been held in Germany since February 1994 and is suspected of torturing to death at least 10 people in prison camps.

Karadzic Rejects Extradition of Suspects to Hague

AU1302194895 Paris AFP in English 1915 GMT 13 Feb 95

[FBIS Transcribed Excerpt] The Hague, Feb 13 (AFP)—An international court Monday indicted 21 Bosnian Serbs on charges of committing war crimes in ex-Yugoslavia, but Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic said none of the suspects would be surrendered.

The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia also said it planned more indictments soon, some of them against non-Serbs.

"Our plans include indicting non-Serbs. This will be done as soon as possible, probably before summer," court spokesman Christian Chartier said.

The indictments accuse 19 suspects of committing war crimes against prisoners in the Omarska detention camp in northwest Bosnia, the tribunal's assistant prosecutor Graham Blewitt announced.

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Blewitt, an Australian, said the two others were charged with atrocities at Omarska and other prison camps. The victims were all Bosnian Moslems or Croats.

But just one of the accused, Dulan "Dusko" Tadic, is currently outside Serb-held Bosnia. [passage omitted]

Investigating judge Adolphus Karibi-Whyte, of Nigeria, issued international arrest warrants for the 20 others—charged with a range of offences including genocide and rape—who Blewitt said all still lived near the scenes of their alleged crimes.

There is provision under the terms of the tribunal's mandate for extraditing suspects.

But Blewitt admitted that "at this point there is no reason to anticipate there will be any cooperation" from Bosnian Serb authorities in handing the 20 over.

Indeed, Karadzic said none of the suspects would be handed over to the tribunal.

Speaking in the northeastern Bosnian town of Bosanski Samac, Karadzic said "no citizen of the Serb Republic" could be handed over to the tribunal in The Hague because the republic's "constitution" forbade extradition.

"But we will judge all those proved to have carried out war crimes," Karadzic said. [passage omitted]

The accused, whose alleged atrocities can be detailed in their absence to a public hearing by witnesses or victims, would thus effectively be confined to countries that refused to hand them over.

But fears that such measures are merely cosmetic have been underlined by the precedent of Dragan Nikolic, a Bosnian Serb currently in Serb-held Bosnia against whom the tribunal issued an international arrest warrant in November.

The alleged commandant of the Susica camp in northeast Bosnia, Nikolic has yet to be extradited by Bosnian Serb authorities.

The Bosnian government, meanwhile, has agreed to comply with any extradition request by the tribunal.

Tribunal sources said indictments would shortly be filed against a number of other suspects, including non-Serbs.

"We intend to indict non-Serbs. We shall do so as soon as possible, and probably before the summer," said spokesman Christian Chartier.

Blewitt said the forthcoming charges would concern suspects in war crimes committed in other Serb camps in the northwest Bosnian Prijedor region.

Karadzic Says War Criminals To Be Tried

LD1302171995 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 1636 GMT 13 Feb 95

[Item received via fax]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Bosanski Samac, 13 Feb (SRNA)—Radovan Karadzic, president of the Bosnian Serb republic [RS], stated today in Samac that the RS will put on trial anyone for whom it is established that they have committed war crimes.

"Our constitution proscribes the handing over of RS citizens, but we will bring to trial anyone who it can be proved committed a war crime," Dr. Karadzic pointed out in a statement for SRNA, reacting to today's statement by the international war crimes' court in The Hague. [passage omitted]

Karadzic Assails French Initiative for Conference

LD1302194295 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 1852 GMT 13 Feb 95

[Item received by fax]

[FBIS Translated Text] Samac, 13 Feb (SRNA)—Radovan Karadzic, president of the [Bosnian] Serb republic, said today that the French initiative on setting up a new conference on the former Yugoslavia is in fact an attempt, as he put it, to "literally dictate to the Serbs a kind of condition for restoring peace on which they can have no influence."

In Karadzic's opinion, apart from this, the intention of those who are suggesting this conference is to save the Contact Group as it faces collapse due to its failure to accept the Serbs' justified demands.

"You cannot dictate to a winning people, such as the Serb people in the Serb republic and the republic of Serb Krajina, conditions and political solutions regardless of its will and interests," Radovan Karadzic stressed in a statement to Radio Samac.

In his words, a way out of this grave situation lies in the unification of all Serb lands, thus presenting the world with the fateful dilemma whether to wage an unpredictable war against 12 million Serbs or recognize the Serb states.

The president of the Serb republic noted that the Serb republic and the republic of Serb Krajina will most resolutely oppose the deployment of NATO forces as replacements for the UN Protection Force along any section of the borders of the western Serb lands.

Speaking about the efforts of the French diplomats to bring about mutual recognition of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, former Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Croatia at a Paris summit, President Karadzic said:

"I believe that this will not take place and that President Milosevic must not do this and ignore the will of the entire Serb people!"

Bosnian Serb Assembly on Independents' Letter

LD1302172895 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 1636 GMT 13 Feb 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Samac, 13 February (SRNA)—At its session in Samac today, the Serb republic people's

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assembly rejected as unfounded a letter from a group of independent deputies to the Serb republic president and assembly speaker urging the acceptance of the contact group peace plan.

During the discussion in the first part of the session, which referred to the internal political situation and inter-Serbian relations, a majority of deputies agreed that the independent deputies' letter and allegations contained within it ought to be rejected.

Deputy Slobodan Bijelic presented well-founded arguments and thus refuted allegations contained in the Club-7 letter to Karadzic and Krajisnik.

"Someone else is doing your thinking for you and is giving you orders," Bijelic said, addressing the independent deputies.

Foreign Minister Aleksa Buha confirmed that the Serb republic delegation sought equal treatment for all sides in negotiations with the contact group, which, as he put it, they "flatly disregarded."

"I can submit a report on all four meetings that we have had with the contact group, at which we saw for ourselves that their tough stances cannot be changed," Buha said.

The assembly speaker adjourned the session at 1400 [1300 GMT]; the assembly session is to be resumed at 1600 [1500 GMT].

Serb Assembly President Denies 'Rift'

LD1302143795 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 1251 GMT 13 Feb 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Samac, 13 Feb (SRNA)—Momcilo Krajisnik, president of the people's assembly of the Serb republic, said today at the 49th session of the Serb republic parliament in Samac that there have been attempts to cause a rift in the Serb republic assembly, but it has not happened "because a majority of deputies who have been working under very difficult conditions have completely fulfilled their patriotic duty."

In his report on the work of the assembly in the period between October 1993 to December 1994, Krajisnik stressed that the assembly has always been in favor of peace and ending the war, but not to the detriment of the Serb people.

Speaking about the Contact Group plan, Krajisnik said that the Serb people clearly said no to it at a referendum, adding that it could be accepted as a basis for future negotiations but in no way as a final solution, "because the plan offers a union on the territory of former Bosnia-Herzegovina that is different from the European Union which is made up of sovereign states."

The Serb republic people's assembly chairman said that the union proposed to the Serb republic by the Contact Group "is completely in harmony with a declaration on the independent and sovereign Bosnia-Herzegovina which our enemies adopted in the absence of Serb deputies at the beginning of 1992."

"There is no mention of the Serb republic within that union; only a Serb entity is mentioned, which would with time melt into Bosnia-Herzegovina as a sovereign state, this being the final goal of our opponents," Krajisnik concluded.

Independent Deputies Threaten To Leave Assembly

LD1302144395 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 1401 GMT 13 Feb 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Samac, 13 Feb (SRNA)—Milorad Dodik, chairman of the club of independent deputies in the Serb republic people's assembly, stated in Samac today that the independent deputies will persevere at today's session in its effort to have "the contact group plan accepted as a basis for further negotiations."

"We believe that until a comprehensive agreement on peace negotiations is reached, there can be no implementation of the agreement on the cessation of hostilities," Dodik said.

Asked whether the club of independent deputies has been officially constituted in line with parliamentary procedure, he replied: "As far as we are concerned it has, but if they start bringing our constituting into question, we shall leave the assembly."

Karadzic: Leadership Will Never Betray People

LD1302205995 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 2005 GMT 13 Feb 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Samac, 13 Feb (SRNA)—Radovan Karadzic, president of the Serb republic [RS], said tonight in Samac that the leadership of the Serb republic will never betray its people. Nor will it sign anything that would be detrimental or shameful to it.

Addressing the assembly and responding to a letter from the club of independent deputies, President Karadzic asked what its true aim was since it was known that throughout all the negotiations the RS has had only one alternative, that is, its annihilation.

"According to the Contact Group's proposal, the state of Bosnia-Herzegovina continues to exist as a state while the Serb republic would dilute its sovereignty in Bosnia-Herzegovina, whereas we believe that the RS cannot be submerged within any state except for Serbia," Karadzic said.

According to him, the Contact Group wants to reach the goal which the West has set for it and, later on, to transfer the conflict to Kosovo.

"Some deputies are asking us, why are you not negotiating? We can only negotiate on the basis of a proposed plan as opposed to a plan that has been accepted.

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Otherwise, what are we going to negotiate if we accept the plan," the RS president asked.

He stressed that "we must end this assembly meeting with a clear standpoint regarding who is making this country's policy decisions and where," and added that "if the assembly believes that we should surrender and end the war in this way, then let it vote for this."

"I am not a candidate for betrayal and I will not betray this nation," Karadzic said, stressing that the RS leadership can accept negotiations only on the basis of equality.

"I would like to publicly state that on the Drina they have closed the last hole through which something could pass, and they have suffocated our economy. But we are prepared to gloss over this if the interests of the people are at stake," the RS president said.

According to him, although the Serb people have a tendency toward splits, "we in the RS have succeeded in avoiding political rifts and we should not allow regional splits to creep in by the back door."

"We have clearly said that we do not want to live in the former Bosnia-Herzegovina because if Bosnia had the right to secede from Yugoslavia then we, too, have the right to leave the former Bosnia-Herzegovina," President Karadzic concluded.

Serb Assembly Willing To Have Peace Talks

LD1302213695 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 2059 GMT 13 Feb 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Samac, 13 Feb (TANJUG)—The people's assembly of the [Bosnian] Serb republic is willing to have talks, on equal terms and without ultimatums, with the international Contact Group and international mediators about the peace process, the assembly concluded at its session today.

Everyone, except one deputy who refrained from voting, voted in support of this conclusion.

The RS assembly expressed its readiness for talks with representatives of Serbia provided this is not conditional upon acceptance of the Contact Group's plan.

The deputies to the RS people's assembly adopted a letter to Republic of Serbia President Slobodan Milosevic, expressing the hope that Serbia will not repeat the same mistake that the international community made by recognizing Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Apart from this, the deputies hope that the Drina will not be an iron curtain between the two parts of the Serb people.

This session also saw the official launch of the club of independent deputies, including seven deputies who were members of the Party of Reform Forces in the former assembly of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

The debate at today's session focused on internal policies and matters relating to the legitimacy and status of deputies and talks held by RS businessmen in Serbia.

Serb Assembly Bans Unauthorized Foreign Contacts

LD1302221995 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 2140 GMT 13 Feb 95

[Item received by fax]

[FBIS Translated Text] Samac, 13 Feb (TANJUG)—Individual and group contacts between deputies of the people's assembly of the Serb republic and representatives of the Contact Group or the international community regarding the crisis in the former Bosnia-Herzgovina will not be allowed in the future, deputies to the assembly decided at their session tonight.

According to this decision, contacts with the international community can only be conducted by those individuals who are authorized to do so under the constitution, or else those who have been authorized by the people's assembly.

The deputies today also adopted a law on applying the law on conditions for carrying out investigative procedures at a time of imminent war threat.

The assembly continued its work by debating a report on work and problems in the following newspapers: GLAS SRPSKI, OSLOBODJENJE, and JAVNOST.

The assembly is expected to adjourn the session following the debate on this point and resume work at 1000 tomorrow.

Karadzic Rejects Contact Group Plan Talks

LD1302192795 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1839 GMT 13 Feb 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Samac, 13 Feb (TANJUG)—Radovan Karadzic, president of the [Bosnian] Serb republic [RS], repeated in Samac today that there can be no negotiating on the basis of the Contact Group's plan, and in no event on the basis of acceptance of this plan.

Addressing deputies of the RS people's assembly who were attending their 49th session, Karadzic said that accdording to the Contact Group's peace plan, Serbs in Bosnia do not have a state and they will not agree to this.

"Our minimum demand is for an RS state and the aim would be for it to merge with Serbia; this RS will not become part of the state of Bosnia-Herzegovina," he said, adding: "If someone wants us to disappear, they will have to come and conquer us."

Reacting to the initiative of the club of independent deputies, Karadzic said the RS assembly is the only place where decisions are made on foreign policy, and he demanded that the deputies today work out a definitive standpoint on the resumption of the peace process.

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"It must be known who is making this country's policy decisions and where they are being made," Karadzic stressed.

He added that the RS "has a formulation" which would facilitate acceptance of the further resumption of the negotiations with the Contact Group and that he also expects this.

Judging by the reaction of deputies to Karadzic's speech, it is hard to believe that the assembly will change its earlier decision relating to the Contact Group's plan.

The RS president's address was preceded by a series of speeches by deputies from the Serb Democratic Party's club and the independent deputies' club. The independent deputies continued to assert that the RS and assembly unity are things that they constantly favor, but that they are requesting that a return to the negotiating process should be attempted on the basis of the Contact Group's existing peace plan.

The assessment was also made by the independent deputies' club that RS foreign policy cannot be accredited with a pass mark; this is supported by the fact that up to now the RS has failed to win over anyone as an ally.

The RS assembly is continuing its debate on internal political issues.

Commentary on Possibility of Juppe's Conference

AU1302210095 Ljubljana OSLOBODJENJE (Europe edition) in Serbo-Croatian 9 Feb 95 p 1

[Commentary by Senad Avdic: "The Bosnian Spirit"]

[FBIS Translated Text] French Foreign Minister Alain Juppe—as the European diplomat "with the most initiative"—has demanded that a new conference on Yugoslavia be held as soon as possible, as he pointed out, before it is too late. Juppe added that it will be too late in three months, when, after the cease-fire in Bosnia expires, and when UNPROFOR [UN Protection Force] may have left Croatia, a new, much fiercer and more uncertain round of war could start, the scope of which the world would hardly ever be able to resolve.

While three months ago Juppe supported the connections of the "Serb entity in Bosnia" with Serbia being closer than anticipated by the Contact Group plan (which the Bosnian leadership immediately rejected), Juppe's new plan supports two quite independent entities in Bosnia-Herzegovina: the Croat-Bosniak on one side, and the Bosniak-Serb on the other. Both should be framed in the internationally recognized borders of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

It is hard to foresee how much support of the international diplomatic establishment Alain Juppe will procure for his initiative for a new conference on the old Yugoslavia. The impression is that there are quite a few arguments in favor of one such summit.

Dealing with Bosnia in a more or less unproductive way, the international community has lost sight of the fact that the situation in Croatia is similar, only frozen, and that Tudjman, warmed up by the dissatisfaction of the people and the opposition, can have it thawed any time he wants. When the Croatian president did so some 15 days ago, the world was not only "reminded" that the problem of the occupation of Croatia is unresolved, but also that it is impossible to resolve in any other way but in a package with the drama of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Milosevic has impertinently refused to receive the proposers of the Z-4 plan (among whom were U.S. and Russian ambassadors in Croatia), thus showing what he thought of their idea, according to which the territories under the Serb occupation would, though symbolically, be brought back under the constitutional and legal system of Croatia. There should be no doubt that Milosevic should have any different opinion about the idea that Karadzic's Serbs be "lured" into any form of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

For the first (London) conference on the former Yugoslavia, the Bosnia-Herzegovina authorities gathered their positions and visions of the future Bosnia-Herzegovina into the Platform of the Presidency. The Platform of the Presidency of Bosnia-Herzegovina portrayed the future of Bosnia-Herzegovina as a democratic state with the highest standards in the sphere of human rights and freedoms guaranteed by modern societies. History will show to what extent this project of state has helped both the state of Bosnia and its people in the further course of the aggression; for the time being, it is possible to say that it was not of any crucial help. However, at present, even the most responsible state officials (not to mention the increasing number of reactions from abroad) point out that the spirit of the platform has been abandoned in some important elements and principles, regardless of the fact that no one in Bosnia-Herzegovina has declaratively renounced the platform.

It has been two and a half years since the London Conference, and much has happened in the meantime. It seems that the Presidency Platform offered the only model that guarantees Bosnia-Herzegovina existence in the way most of the citizens opted for at the referendum. If it is true that "its spirit is threatened," then this indicates both a risk and lack of responsibility. Its spirit may be employed in some other conference....

UNPROFOR Says B-H Army Gaining in Bihac

AU1402122195 Paris AFP in English 1159 GMT 14 Feb 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Sarajevo, Feb 14 (AFP)—The mainly Moslem Bosnian army has made territorial gains in the northwest Bosnian pocket of Bihac and now controls almost all of the entire UN declared safe area, a UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) spokesman said Tuesday.

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The spokesman, Colonel Gary Coward, said the Bosnian soldiers celebrated their victory Monday evening in Bihac town.

Quoting a Bosnian source in Bihac, Coward said the government troops had captured the villages of Zavalje, southwest of Bihac town, and Sokolac to the southeast as well as the hillside region of Culumak.

He said the information could not be independently confirmed by UN observers deployed in the area but the festive mood of the Bosnian troops Monday evening lent credence to their claim.

Coward added that some 300 Bosnian Serb back-up troops had arrived Tuesday south of Bihac after travelling through Serb-held territory in Croatia.

Up to 1,000 other soldiers had arrived in the region Sunday.

Fighting has raged across the northwest enclave since late last year, pitting Bosnian government troops on one side against an alliance of Croatian and Bosnian Serbs and forces loyal to rebel Moslem leader Fikret Abdic.

The UNHCR had hoped to deliver much-needed food supplies to the enclave Tuesday by travelling through Serb-held territory but the latter reneged on an agreement to provide free passage to the UN convoys.

Serbs Ready for Meeting on Cease-Fire Accord

LD1302164495 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1711 GMT 13 Feb 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, Feb. 13 (TANJUG)—Bosnian Serbs are ready to participate in a meeting of military commanders of the warring sides in Bosnia to discuss the implementation of the agreement on a four-month cessation of hostilities, Bosnian Serb military sources said Monday.

The sources said Serbs would participate in the meeting to be held at Sarajevo airport on Feb. 15 in order to confirm their commitment to a peaceful solution and cooperation in the quest for a stable and just peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

The meeting of military commanders of the Bosnian Serbs, Croats and Muslims, in which the central commission for the monitoring of the four-month truce would also take part, has been brokered by U.N. Commander for Bosnia-Herzegovina, British General Rupert Smith in an effort to spur the peace process.

The agreement on the four-month truce for all of Bosnia-Herzegovina was signed Dec. 31, 1994 and it went into effect on Jan. 1 this year.

Muslim army chief, General Rasim Delic has conditioned the Muslim side's participation in the meeting on a ceasefire in the area of the town of Bihac in northwestern Bosnia and unhindered humanitarian deliveries to Bosnian Muslims.

The Bosnian Croat side has taken no stand so far.

Bosnian Serb military sources said troops of the Sarajevo-based Muslim government continued launching offensive operations from the U.N.-protected "safe area" of Bihac.

The sources said humanitarian deliveries intended for Muslims had been crossing Bosnian Serb territory unhindered. They specified that all convoys announced for Sunday had reached their destinations.

Bosnian Serb army sources said Muslims were again trying to make it seem that Serbs were preventing the resumption of the quest for a peaceful solution to the nearly three-year-old Bosnian crisis.

TANJUG on Muslim Troops in UNPROFOR

LD1302191895 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1908 GMT 13 Feb 95

[by Boris Delic]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, Feb. 13 (TANJUG)—Troops from Muslim countries will soon account for over a third of the U.N. force in Bosnia, which has special political weight in these lands where religious intolerance has been present for centuries and is especially acute now.

The presence of so many troops from Muslim countries in Bosnia-Herzegovina, causes the Serb side to be apprehensive and suspicious and cannot but cast a shadow on the good intentions of the mission of the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR).

Such a situation also increases tensions in the region, where a civil war of Bosnian Muslims, Orthodox Serbs and Catholic Croats has been raging for three years.

According to the latest figures, there are 37,859 U.N. troops in former Yugoslavia, including 21,776 in Bosnia.

Malaysia recently announced that it would send a new contingent to Bosnia between Feb. 24 and March 19.

Malaysian Defense Minister Abdul Razak said the U.N. had agreed to accept 1,531 more Malaysian soldiers for UNPROFOR, in addition to the 1,633 already present.

It is a fact that 37 countries have contributed troops to UNPROFOR, including 18 European and only eight Islamic countries.

Having these figures in mind, the new Malaysian contingent might not be indicative, since it would seem that the number of countries is proportionate to the number of troops.

Any changes, starting from Croatia's radical announcements that it will cancel UNPROFOR's mandate in Croatia to replacements of command personnel or changes in the structure of the peace force, are a subject of the most subtle political analyses.

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It should therefore be specified that there are 12,994 troops from countries with a majority Muslim population among the 37,859 UNPROFOR troops in former Yugoslavia.

Maps of UNPROFOR's deployment show that the Bangladesh battalion is in sector Bihac, the Egyptian in sector Sarajevo, the Turkish in Zenica, the Pakistani in Vares and Banovici, the Malaysian in Konjic... all towns in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

UNPROFOR troops from Muslim countries are deployed mostly in territories controlled by Bosnian Muslim leader Alija Izetbegovic, an ardent advocate of an Islamic state in Bosnia, but who has lately even been criticized by Turkish papers for his extremism.

Foreign media have reported that it is a matter for concern that there are close ties between certain UNPROFOR troops and Islamic fanatics, foreign mercenaries, who are in Izetbegovic's army.

B-H Army, HVO Officers on Kresevo Meeting

AU1302200495 Ljubljana OSLOBODJENJE (Europe edition) in Serbo-Croatian 9 Feb 95

[B-H PRESS report on meeting of representatives of Bosnia-Herzegovina Army and HVO in Kresevo on 1 February: "If UNPROFOR Leaves"]

[FBIS Translated Text] On Wednesday, 1 February, a meeting of the delegations of the Army of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Croatian Defense Council [HVO] was held in Kresevo. The delegations were headed by Army General Rasim Delic and Major General Tihomir Blaskic respectively. The other representatives present were Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation President Kresimir Zubak, member of the Presidency of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina and deputy president of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Ejup Ganic, Interior Minister Bakir Alispahic and his deputy, Jozo Leutar, and representatives of the Joint Headquarters, Brigadier General Fikret Muslimovic and Brigadier Zivko Budimir.

Specific Measures

In an open and constructive dialogue, relations and further forms of cooperation between the Army of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Republic and the HVO were considered. Specific measures and tasks aimed at dealing with the present problems, particularly those relating to the security of movement, as well as ways of improving the activities of the Joint Headquarters and the resolving of the issue of searching for missing persons were agreed upon. A document consisting of decisions and tasks regarding the latter was signed, defining the promotion of cooperation and relations between the Army of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the HVO.

Apart from the above, a certain number of other issues of interest for both the Army of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Republic and the HVO were also considered. The Press Center of the Army of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina said that the next meeting to operationalize the Kresevo agreement would be held within 15 days.

After the meeting, Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation President Kresimir Zubak, the deputy president of the Federation, Dr. Ejup Ganic, Major General Tihomir Blaskic, and Army General Rasim Delic gave the following statements:

"Our discussion was held in an atmosphere of tolerance, and I think this is another stage of reestablishing the trust between the HVO formations and the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army," said Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation President Kresimir Zubak.

"We decided that it was necessary to analyze the situation on the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina, especially how the decision of the Republic of Croatia on the UNPROFOR [UN Protection Force] withdrawal could reflect on this military and political situation. In that sense, we have established specific tasks for the Joint Headquarters. We also discussed ways of completing the work on the road from Fojnica to Prozor, as well as ways of starting military production in Vitez. We discussed a number of issues that the officers of the Joint Headquarters should actualize. I think we made significant progress today," added President Zubak.

Identify the Resistance

"This was a very productive meeting. We analyzed the decisions of the last meeting, as well as some new issues," said the deputy president of the Federation, Dr. Ejup Ganic.

"I would not go into details, but I can tell you that the Joint Headquarters is functioning and that good results have been achieved, many of them on the ground. Today, we agreed on how to improve the methods of operations and overcome all the problems regarding communications and other things.

"All in all, the cooperation between the Army of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the HVO is going as planned, and the results are getting better by the day. I think that the two peoples are really on the course to prosperity. With the federation concept, all the problems are being resolved. The people support the federation. We must identify resistance, the individuals who are slowing down the project," added Dr. Ganic.

"I believe that the meeting was very successful," said Major General Tihomir Blaskic. "Regarding the historical decision that was made in the Republic of Croatia by President Tudjman regarding the cancelling of the UNPROFOR mandate, the possible development and reflection of the situation on the federation territories was considered. On the other hand, we openly considered and agreed upon the actualization of the issues we had already agreed upon in the Split Agreement and the agreement signed in Kresevo on 13 November 1994. The

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particularly important thing is that we defined the deadline for the redeployment of the operational part of the Joint Headquarters and the location of the Joint Headquarters, which is sure to improve the cooperation on the ground and speed up the resolving of certain issues that are of particular interest for coordinated activities of the HVO formations and the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army."

Occasional Incidents

"This meeting was as successful as the previous ones," said Army General Rasim Delic. "I see it all in the context of implementing the Split Agreement. We analyzed the implementation of the decisions from the previous meeting in Kresevo. Most of the tasks have been implemented, and the drawing up of some documents that were supposed to facilitate what has not been done yet was now accurately defined and agreed upon. I think that in these talks, we have resolved some of the problems that sometimes concern certain incidents, that is, the way of resolving such problems. We will make sure that possible problems of this kind are resolved faster at the level of regions and corps commands. All in all, I expected such an outcome of the meeting, since I am very satisfied with everything that has been achieved since the Split Agreement. It is always possible to find faults, but we should look for what is good, and many good things have been actualized through our joint meetings and activities," said Delic.

UNHCR Suspected of 'Special Warfare'

AU1402130495 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1100 GMT 14 Feb 95

[Report by Dino Spahic from Srebrenica]

[FBIS Translated Text] The Srebrenica municipal authorities have so far on several occasion appealed to the Government of the Republic and Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the cantonal government in Tuzla, and international organizations with the intention of finding a solution for relocating UN High Commissioner for Refugees [UNHCR] warehouses for Srebrenica, which are currently located in Belgrade, as well the International Red Cross (?warehouses) currently located in Pale. In this way, all logistical aid for Srebrenica would be relocated to Tuzla rather than remaining in Pale and Belgrade. In its present situation, the UNHCR is unable to provide timely and sufficient amounts of basic foodstuffs like salt, sugar, cooking oil, baby food, and flour. It is worth noting that a significant part of the humanitarian aid for Srebrenica ends up on the territory of the so-called Serbian republic. For example, the last three convoys that reached Srebrenica brought [words indistinct] fuel, as if a steel smeltery were located in Srebrenica. [Words indistinct] Based on this, it is suspected in Srebrenica that the UNHCR—consciously and in collusion with Karadzic's Serbs—is participating in the devious game of special warfare with the goal of maximally and systematically oppressing and blackmailing the Bosniak people in the area.

Turkish Parliament Members Visit Zenica, Travnik

TA1402091295 Ankara TRT Television Network in Turkish 1800 GMT 13 Feb 95

[Burak Gercek video report from Zenica]

[FBIS Translated Text] Members of the Turkish Grand National Assembly Bosnia-Herzegovina Investigation Committee, who are holding various contacts in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia, visited the Turkish peace force serving in Zenica. The delegation was first briefed on the political and military situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina and then on the organization and activities of the Turkish peace force. After that, Colonel Mehmet Ali Erdogan, commander of the Turkish peace force mission, gave committee chairman Sait Kemal Mimaroglu a shield. The committee members made a contribution to the fund set up by the Turkish peace force to help the people of Zenica.

After the briefing, the committee members visited Regional Commander (Hasip Hocic), who, after briefing them on the problems in the region, stressed that Turkey has always helped them in their most difficult days. He stated that the deployment of the Turkish unit in Zenica has given them a great morale boost.

Mimaroglu said the Turkish Government and people will continue to be on the side of Bosnia-Herzegovina as they have been in the past. He said the committee will do all it can in light of the information it received from the Turkish unit.

Other officials who attended the meeting briefed the committee members on the problems facing Zenica and the region. After that meeting, Mimaroglu told TRT the following:

[Begin Mimaroglu recording] We told the regional officials that Turkey is ready to support them. We told them of Turkey's sensitivity about the issue, that Turkey will do all it can to promote the cause of Bosnia-Herzegovina in the world, and that our committee has assumed these duties. [end recording]

Finally, the committee members visited Travnik, where the mayor briefed them on the city's problems. They then left for Split in Croatia.

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Tudjman News Conference Addresses UNPROFOR

LD1002222395 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1100 GMT 10 Feb 95

[News conference by President Franjo Tudjman with domestic and foreign correspondents at the Presidential Palace in Zagreb—live]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Raic] Kolja Raic of Croatian television. Good morning, Mr. President. Two related questions: What is the thinking of the Knin authorities on the interruption of all negotiations with the Croatian Government, and how do you think this will affect the situation in Croatia?

[Tudjman] The stand expressed by the Knin local authorities reflects the fact that they have considered and used the UNPROFOR [UN Protection Force] units to continue occupying Croatian lands. However, it is to be expected that reason will prevail even among them, that they will not prevent the further peaceful process of reintegrating these regions into the constitutional system of Croatia and that what has begun with the opening of the [Zagreb-Lipovac] highway, the gas pipeline, and so on, will continue.

[Correspondent] [name indistinct] of Bosnia-Herzegovina radio and television. Mr. President, a very fierce offensive against Bihac was launched yesterday from the so-called Serb autonomous region of Krajina. I am interested to know, since the aim of the current aggression against Bihac is, as we know, to link the so-called Serb republic and the so-called republic of Serb Krajina—which would threaten the integrity of Croatia—whether Croatia will do anything to prevent this from happening; and, if so, what?

[Tudjman] I think your question overemphasizes the threat to the integrity of Croatia. The integrity of Croatia is threatened by the occupation of the occupied territories, and we made the decision to terminate the UNPROFOR mandate precisely in order to resolve this problem. As far as the offensive is concerned, I have not heard that it is as major as you have described, and if the Bosnian forces—the forces of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army—and the HVO [Croatian Defense Council] have succeeded so far in holding the territory, I do not see any great danger that the Serb forces might overrun this area. In any case, it is also indicative for the international public that the Serb forces in the occupied areas are still being used in the offensive in Bosnia as well, which also indicates the need to resolve that problem.

[Correspondent] [name indistinct] of Deutsche Welle. I know that you have negotiated on a cease-fire with armed terrorists, which is a common practice in the world, but it is not normal to conduct political talks with such people. Not even Israel did so with the PLO, nor England with the IRA; so please, could you explain to me why you are conducting political talks with terrorists, with the rebel leaders of the Croatian Serbs who call themselves the leaders of a phantom state? Should not the partners in the talks be representatives elected to the Croatian Assembly in 1990 or representatives of the municipalities of Knin, Glina, and so on?

[Tudjman] First of all, it is not correct that Israel did not negotiate with representatives of the PLO. It did, just as the British Government had talks with the Irish. In other words, all warring parties in the world from time immemorial have held talks in order to end conflicts, because conflict is always damaging—not only to the warring parties but also to the international community. In this case, we are holding talks in order to achieve a peaceful situation, because this is demanded by the entire international community. Clearly, however, we will not give way in the face of any kind of demands—least of all terrorist demands—in political negotiations. On the contrary, we will consistently adhere to international conventions—and in our case to our Constitution and constitutional law—in solving all the issues on the agenda.

[Correspondent, in English] Representative of [words indistinct]. Mr. President, I have two questions.

[Interpreter] ...of the Chinese news agency.

[Correspondent, in English] [Words indistinct] UNPROFOR [words indistinct] wanted to continue to stay.

[Interpreter] The question relates to the president's decision to withdraw UNPROFOR from Croatia. He is asking how the conflict with the Krajina Serbs is going to be solved once UNPROFOR has gone—whether that means another war, or else, if UNPROFOR stays, the peace will be kept.

[Tudjman] We are going to continue our efforts not only after the cancellation [of UNPROFOR], but also after the departure of the existing UNPROFOR formations, so that a peaceful solution can be found. It is our opinion that UNPROFOR's departure cannot result in another war. As responsible statesmen, we are not going to rule out, and we must not rule out, the possibility of incidents in some areas. For our part, though, we are going to do our best to continue the process of solving things peacefully, to bring about normalization,a general normalization in Croatian-Serbian relations. We believe that another war is in the interest of neither Belgrade nor Serbia, that this [war] is not even possible given the economic and international position of Serbia and its Yugoslavia.

At the same time, the international community is today fully focused on persuading all the sides to the conflict that what is needed is peace, a peaceful solution. We expect that these efforts, both ours and those of the international community, will yield fruit. Consequently, a peaceful solution, rather than war, will be secured.

[Correspondent] WTN. Mr. President, Croatia's decision to cancel the UNPROFOR mandate demonstrates

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the independence of Croatia's diplomacy. Even Croatia's best friends did not expect such a firm decision. Is Croatia capable of facing up to the consequences of this decision? Will it be able to ban Serb attacks from Krajina on the territory of the neighboring country, bearing in mind that Krajina is Croatian territory?

[Tudjman] Understandably, we made our decision independently, while being fully responsible for such a decision. Furthermore, we believe that our friends, as well as all international factors will realize that this decision was right and that it will accelerate the peace process not only in Croatia but in the area of the former Yugoslavia as well. It is a well-known fact that all the countries of the world's UN organization recognize Croatia's territorial integrity, including even Russia, which is usually counted on by those rebel Serbs and Serbia as their ally. However, the Russian Government has repeatedly said that it recognizes the territorial integrity of Croatia and calls on Croatia's Serbs to solve their problem within the borders of Croatia.

Consequently, the Serbs of Knin cannot expect any kind of support from the international community. As for Serbia itself, it is in Belgrade's interest to put an end to this crisis by participating in the peace process, thus finding a way out of its international isolation and the economic crisis gripping Serbia because of its aggression and its support for the continuing occupation of Croatian areas and its support for the aggression in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Consequently, as far as Croatia is concerned we are going to know how to pursue our policy while being fully responsible to the Croatian people. At the same time, we will know how to harmonize our moves with the interests of the international community without giving up our national interests, without giving up the fundamental state and national interests of sovereign Croatia.

[Correspondent] What do you think will happen if UNPROFOR leaves the separation zone at this moment? Have you prepared for this situation? What do you expect to happen?

[Tudjman] First of all, you know it will not happen now but on 31 March. Apart from this, a three-month deadline was given to UNPROFOR for its final departure. It goes without saying that we did not make such a decision overnight. We thoroughly examined the situation before we decided on any action, depending on the circumstances.

[VJESNIK Correspondent] Mr. President, U.S. Ambassador Galbraith has recently made frequent statements that contain political positions, and this can be identified as interference in the internal matters of another state. What is your view on these statements?

[Tudjman] The U.S. ambassador, together with a group of other representatives involved in the Z-4 plan, is engaged in efforts to draw up a draft resolution that will be used as a basis for reaching a peaceful solution. The Croatian public accepts such an initiative if its intention is to help reach a peaceful solution—and it obviously is. We can only accept that part of the plan that proposes that the Serbian issue in Croatia be resolved within the framework of the territorial integrity of Croatia and within the framework of the Croatian borders. We cannot of course accept anything that is contrary to the Constitution and constitutional law. The constitutional law was adopted within the framework of the international conference on the former Yugoslavia, particularly with regard to ways of solving the matter concerning the Serbian ethnic community, the Serbian minority in Croatia. The constitutional law envisages possibilities for resolving this issue at the level of international conventions.

Your view, and this is not just your view, the citizens of Croatia contacted me wanting to know why not just Ambassador Galbraith, but also some other people make such statements, which—as you mentioned—are in fact interference in the internal matters of Croatia [sentence as heard]. When judging such statements, we must proceed from the premise that they wish to contribute to the peaceful solution, that they fear the war will spread, i.e. their intentions are based on that. In any case, Croatia is justified in its demands that foreign representatives and ambassadors in Croatia, who are attached to the government of the sovereign state of Croatia, bear in mind that they are representatives attached to the Croatian Government and that they should not exceed the framework of Croatia's constitutional system. Likewise, they should not make proposals that could cause changes to the Constitution or the envisaged constitutional and legal system of Croatia.

[Correspondent Sanja (?Vodic)] NOVI LIST, Voice of Istria. We have all waited a long time for the Z-4 plan, and in the past few days both journalists and politicians have almost learned it by heart. That is why we are familiar with it. I would like you to tell us if and when the talks take place on the basis of the Z-4 plan—and I would really like you to reply in concrete terms—what is the limit beyond which you are not prepared to go? Is there anything in the Z-4 plan that cannot be negotiated under any circumstances?

[Tudjman] I have already said when replying to the first question about the Z-4 plan that Croatia accepted only the part that envisaged a peaceful solution and a solution within Croatian borders. Croatia will not accept, under any circumstances, any drafts giving federal or confederal rights to the Serbs in Croatia.

[Correspondent Luka Leric] Mr. President, Mr. Izetbegovic said he will have talks with Pale. Did he explain to you, as his ally, what effect this will have on the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation and on the confederation? Thank you.

[Tudjman] Mr. Izetbegovic did tell me about it. However, Mr. Izetbegovic is familiar with my stand of four

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years ago—that I advocated a peaceful solution, through negotiations, to the crisis on former Yugoslav soil. With this in view, I have nothing against Mr. Izetbegovic—as a representative of the Bosniak Muslim people—having talks with Pale, with those representatives of the Serb people who resorted to aggression and initially took advantage of the help offered by the Yugo-Communists, and later on of their weapons in order to conquer two-thirds of Bosnia's territory. As you know, the international community as a whole is also in favor of talks between all warring sides. I am also not against the talks. On the contrary, I am in favor of the talks that will lead to a solution for ending the war, which will bring to an end the crisis in the former Yugoslavia and which will create conditions for a new international order in the former Yugoslavia, in this part of southeastern Europe and in the neighboring Balkans, on the basis of the mutual recognition of those countries that have been created and are being created on former Yugoslav soil.

[Correspondent] [name indistinct], REUTERS. By terminating UNPROFOR's mandate Croatia got itself into the position of being held responsible for any future escalation of the conflict. How do you expect to get out of this diplomatic checkmate?

[Tudjman] Croatia is not in a checkmate position. Croatia has taken such a stand out of a desire to resolve the problem of its occupied areas as soon as possible, in the spirit of numerous UN Security Council resolutions and in the spirit of the UN General Assembly resolution on Croatia's occupied areas. All the international players who expressed concern over this decision by Croatia have said they now fully understood the justifiability of the Croatian demands. Consequently, all future steps will be taken in the context of Croatia as a sovereign country assuming the right to resolve the issue that the international community recognized as an internal Croatian issue. Croatia has proved that it is sufficiently prepared to coordinate its moves with the international community as long as that community does not question Croatia's interests. In this case we could no longer tolerate the occupation of the Croatian territories and had to make a decision. We have already told all those who think that the Bosnian crisis should have been solved first—and we tell them again—that we cannot wait for the very complex Bosnian crisis to be solved, as this process can take time. The problem of the occupied areas of Croatia is simpler to resolve, as there are no such problems; and I quote Mr. Galbraith, who told the Serbs that no country in the world will ever recognize any Krajina; therefore, the Serbian issue should be resolved within the framework of Croatia. There are no doubts about that. The resolving of the Bosnian crisis, however, will take time.

[Correspondent] ASSOCIATED PRESS. Mr. President, you mentioned earlier that you expected the rebel Krajina Serbs to see reason. Do you expect Serbian President Milosevic to make them see reason? Finally, everyone, including the Contact Group, recognizes that Milosevic is the necessary factor in settling the crisis and everyone is starting talks with him again. Will this result in the continuation of a little big Serbia, as your close assistant described it in the latest issue of GLASNIK? Could this disturb the relations in the Federation?

[Tudjman] It is obvious that Belgrade is the main factor—and especially Milosevic—in the settlement of the issue of Croatia's occupied areas. Belgrade had armed the Croatian Serbs via the Yugo-Communist Army and then by all other means. It has continued to supply them with arms and dinars. Therefore, Belgrade bears the brunt of responsibility, and it cannot shed this responsibility.

I also think it has become evident via certain political moves and among the public in Belgrade that they [the Krajina Serbs] must renounce the occupation of the Croatian areas, that a number of Serbian ringleaders in Knin have already accepted the talks, and that a number of results have already been achieved, e.g. the reopening of the highway, the oil pipeline, the start of a mine-sweeping operation on the railways, and the start of talks on reopening the railway traffic. All this has created conditions for a peaceful settlement and for the peaceful reintegration of the occupied areas.

However, given the influence of Bosnian Serbs from Pale on Knin, it remains to be seen how things develop in the future. We must bear in mind that there are irrational and extreme elements among them. However, in given international circumstances and in internal relations we can still expect commonsense to prevail, and that those who listen to the voice of ordinary people from the occupied areas [will win out]—the people who have had enough of war and enough of this situation, and who would like things to return to normal as soon as possible.

[Correspondent Zivkovic] Ante Zivkovic, VIJESNIK. Mr. President, you responded positively to a proposal by French Foreign Affairs Minister Alain Juppe to begin a new round of negotiations for the peaceful resolution of the crisis in this part of Europe. However, according to FRANKFURTER ALGEMEINE ZEITUNG, Alija Izetbegovic, president of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Presidency, spoke about a danger of a separate agreement being reached between Croatia and Serbia. Can you please comment on that?

[Tudjman] We have accepted the initiative by French Foreign Minister Juppe, just as we have accepted every other initiative that has been launched so far, both by the international conference on former Yugoslavia and the USA, in order to reach a political solution. The problem lies in this really complex case of the crisis in Bosnia.

You know that this crisis has lasted for centuries. Last century, the key European and world powers had to resolve it at the Berlin Congress. People who approached this problem in a more serious way, in a way above petty politics, were aware that something of this kind had to happen in the end, and result in the current crisis. They

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knew that the key people, or five key powers or Europe on one side, as it is at the moment...[changes thought] we must not forget that there is also not enough unity within the European Union when it comes to this issue [changes thought] but still: Europe on one side, the USA and Russia on the other, they will have to tackle seriously this issue, which is not only a problem of a Muslim-Croat-Serb conflict and settlement but is also the issue of finding a settlement between civilizations.

In the end, international players will have to tackle this issue in such a way as to find a solution that will be the optimal solution for all three nations living in Bosnia-Herzegovina, but likewise for the separation of civilizations that have been present in that area since time immemorial—since the Roman Empire, Christianity, up to the present day.

On the other hand, it is obvious...[pauses] Let me answer this question: In negotiations and talks that we have been conducting for the normalization of Croatian-Serbian relations in order to find a solution for the occupied areas in Croatia—and not only for the occupied areas in Croatia but also for the normalization of relations between Croatia and Serbia...[rephrases] in these negotiations there was no discussion of dividing Bosnia or reaching a solution to the detriment of Bosnia.

But it is likewise clear—serious people are aware of it. I wrote about it some 20 years ago—that a solution for the latent crisis that existed in the former Yugoslavia, a solution to the instability of the Balkans, can be found only in the sense of the Scandinavization of the Balkans. This means, now that the Yugoslav state has disintegrated, that it can be achieved on the basis of mutual recognition, just as happened between Sweden, Denmark, Norway, and Finland.

It is clear that both the Croatian and Serbian nations—as the oldest nations with the largest population in this area, and with the most prominently expressed state-building characteristics—are the main players to be involved in achieving the new international order. There could be no peace. nor any sort of European Union in Europe until reconciliation and normalization of relations between Germany and France, the two countries that were most at war with each other in Europe in the last and in this century,took place. It is a historical necessity and in the interest of not only Croatia and Serbia but all other nations in this area and throughout Europe for normalization of Croatian-Serbian relations to take place eventually, as it is a precondition for the creation of the new international order in this part of southeastern Europe.

[Correspondent Ramljak] Olga Ramljak, SLOBODNA DALMACIJA. In that connection, it has often been said that a conflict between Croat and Muslim forces in Bosnia-Herzegovina could break out again, which will be detrimental to both national communities in that country. We have seen fresh efforts to jump-start the federation. What is Croatia doing in connection with that? And, will you stick to your statement that you will not hold talks with Serbian President Milosevic before the Republic of Croatia is recognized by Belgrade?

[Tudjman] Speaking of Croat-Muslim relations, we should remember that these clashes broke out not only because of subjective, but also because of objective reasons when the international community offered a solution to the Bosnian crisis envisaging a union of three republics. The Muslim republic then wanted to gain access to the sea at the expense of Croat areas from Mostar all the way to Neum. So, these were objective reasons that, in addition to various petty political intrigues and subjective mistakes, caused the Croat-Muslim conflict.

However, owing to our efforts and the efforts of the international community—primarily the USA, which took the initiative and under whose auspices the Washington Agreement was signed—that conflict was ended and the process of setting up the Muslim-Croat Federation began with the outline of a confederation between that federation and Croatia.

Let us now face the facts. After that agreement, there has not been a single clash between Croats and Muslims. That is a huge achievement of the Washington Agreement—as well as the realization among both Croats and Muslims that it is in their mutual interest and in the interest of Western civilization for that agreement to hold, for a conflict of civilizations to be avoided.

At the same time, the agreement between Israel—the Jews—and the Palestinians was reached under the auspices of the USA, but there are daily clashes and huge victims. So, not all agreements have the same weight. Whether subjective intentions—either positive or negative—will have certain consequences depends on the objective situation

In a word, good results were achieved because the two sides need to cooperate, and because certain preconditions for the success of the federation and for good relations with Croatia—inasmuch as confederal relations are concerned—already exist. The latest meeting in Munich was in line with Croatia's proposals. I personally suggested that the international community—or rather: the international players that were interested, that recommended to us a confederation with the Muslims—come forward as arbiters for solving disputed issues and the issues standing in the way of an effective implementation of the Washington Agreement. I am convinced that we are on the way to a successful solution to the problems of creating a federation. Of course, we should also look for possibilities for setting up an effective confederation with Croatia—because the federation alone will not be enough for the Croat people, considering the number and position of Croats in Bosnia-Herzegovina, if they do not have a guarantee for their survival and equality in the form of confederal relations.

As for your second question, although we agreed to ask only one question at a time: I do stick to my statement.

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Of course, in that respect too, I will also stick to what I told you once before: I am ready to undertake every diplomatic and other effort that will lead to an end to the war crisis and spare further victims—even a single Croat victim—in the process of achieving national goals. In the same way, I am determined to resort to the last means, should that be in the interest of defending Croatian freedom and sovereignty.

[Correspondent] Gordana [surname indistinct], German TV. There has recently been a lot of talk about mutual recognition of Croatia and Serbia, that is, Yugoslavia. It seems the problem lies in different interpretations of the borders. Do you think we could see the mutual recognition soon? Could that happen during Mr. Granic's visit to Belgrade?

[Tudjman] I do not think this could happen during Minister Granic's visit to Belgrade. They will certainly discuss preparations for mutual recognition. But if I understood your question well, any discussion of any border issues within the framework of mutual recognition is completely out of the question. Croatia can only be recognized within its internationally recognized borders.

[Correspondent Markulic] Marko Markulic, "Panorama." Mr. President, I would like to add something to my colleague's question because it is being said that most Croatian politicians see the Z-4 plan as the international community's pressure on Croatia to extend UNPROFOR's mandate. On the other hand, there is talk of Belgrade's recognizing Croatia within its internationally recognized borders onr the condition that UNPROFOR's mandate is extended. Could you comment on that?

[Tudjman] I do not really understand what your question is.

[Markulic] Will Croatia—and under what conditions—agree to extend UNPROFOR's mandate...[Tudjman interrupts]

[Tudjman] I have already said that even if Serbia were to recognize Croatia today within its international borders, we would not keep UNPROFOR—because UNPROFOR was here precisely because the Serbs used it to prolong their occupation, as the latest statement from Knin proves.

Of course, Serbia's recognition will imply that Belgrade has renounced the occupation of the Croatian areas, and it will mean that the Knin leaders will have to agree to negotiate—and not only negotiate, but effectively implement—the agreement on a peaceful solution. In other words, those who are still against a peaceful solution, those who continue to advocate war—in that event, of course, already condemned to failure in every respect—will have no room for activity.

So, the demand for international recognition, also put forward by the international community, and our cancellation of UNPROFOR's mandate are linked. But we clearly said and indicated to important international players that we sent UNPROFOR away because it was not effective. We know that UNPROFOR is not to blame for it, but the local Serb authorities and rebels who prevented the implementation of the Vance plan and UN Security Council resolutions, as well as Belgrade. We know that UNPROFOR's departure means that the rebel Serbs will no longer be able to use UNPROFOR as a smokescreen for occupation. But, we let the international community know that we will be ready to analyze how the international community can supervise a peaceful reintegration of the occupied areas into Croatia's constitutional and legal system.

I think I have already said, and some of my aides have said, this: We would have nothing against a number of observers being deployed along Croatian borders, along our borders with Bosnia and Serbia. Likewise we would have nothing against the international community's acting as an observer. We really wish to resolve this issue in a peaceful way and to secure all ethnic rights for the Serb community, the Serb minority in Croatia, and grant them local self-administration in those areas where they constituted a majority before the war, in keeping with our Constitution and constitutional law.

[Correspondent Stjepan (name indistinct), Bavarian radio] Mr. President, I would like to add to my colleague's question just briefly. Can you explain something? One of the important tasks that UNPROFOR has fulfilled, according to a large majority of people, was supervising agreements reached so far between the Croatian Government and the Knin Serbs. Once UNPROFOR leaves, who is going to fill the void? To put it in concrete terms, who is going to supervise the cease-fire agreement, and highway traffic? Do you think there could be some other international institutions? The international community does not seem to be ready for this. Does the Croatian side have an initiative, or has it even started talks as to who could take over from UNPROFOR?

[Tudjman] First, it was not UNPROFOR that made the reopening of the highway possible. Our political agreement made it possible. The political situation led to the reopening of the highway, to the reopening of the oil pipeline. In this context, UNPROFOR was an observer and offered its good offices, and there we have it: 27 km of the highway was reopened. UNPROFOR did not play a decisive role in this. Such conditions were created because Belgrade was forced to propose to its clients to begin reintegration in a peaceful way. We will allow time to build confidence among the remaining Serb population, and to show that peaceful reintegration into Croatia's constitutional and legal system is in the interest of the Serbs living in occupied areas. Therefore, UNPROFOR's departure will not mean any essential changes as to whether there will be conflicts, and as to how developments will further unfold—peacefully, or some other way.

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What will happen? I have already explained in my reply to previous questions: It will depend on further developments up to the end of March and at the time when UNPROFOR withdraws. As you have all heard or read, NATO is preparing plans and analyzing how to secure the UNPROFOR withdrawal from Croatia.

[Correspondent] Alexandra [name indistinct], DER SPIEGEL. I wanted to ask why the law on ethnic minorities and national communities in Croatia has not yet been implemented? That would be a good signal for the Serbs in the UN-protected areas to join Croatia.

[Tudjman] I do not understand your question. The human, political, ethnic, and cultural rights of the Serbs in Croatia are guaranteed throughout Croatia. The Serbs in Croatia live and work at the Croatian University, at Croatian courts—including the Supreme Court. They are in the parliament and everywhere else. The blame for the law's not being implemented in the occupied areas lies with Belgrade and Serb leaders from Knin to Baranja, who prevented the introduction of that constitutional law.

What we want them to do is to renounce the occupation and accept implementation of the constitutional law in the occupied areas.

[Correspondent] [Name indistinct], HINA [news agency]. Mr. President, the Croatian Government met yesterday under your chairmanship. A statement from your office said that many issues were discussed and that the government had voted on and passed certain conclusions. Could you tell us whether there were any conclusions relevant to this news conference? Were there any crucial decisions?

[Tudjman] At that meeting of the government, we discussed the implementation of national policy on important issues that I addressed in my report on the condition of the state and the nation in the Assembly [on 23 December 1994]. The issues raised then were reviewed in the current circumstances. Thus, we discussed the need for consistent implementation of the economic recovery program by speeding up the process of privatization. We talked about what we need to do to bring about Croatia's demographic recovery and to insure the return of Croatian emigrants. We talked about the need to speed up completion of the judiciary. We also discussed the security and defense aspects of the current situation and all other possibilities.

What is important is that, at that government session, it also became clear that there is total unity within the Croatian Government, as well as between the Croatian Government and the majority in the Assembly and the Croatian public in general. Everyone agrees that we should continue the political process that, after the establishment of the independent democratic Croatia, brought the stability of the democratic system to Croatia and the political stability that, recognized by the most eminent international economic players, has led to the possibility of economic stabilization and to the successes that the government has achieved in its stabilization program and as regards the internal and external convertibility of Croatia's national currency. This also led to the need to take improved steps for solving social issues; for improving the positions of certain categories of pensioners; for solving the problem of the return of refugees and displaced persons, which is connected with the process of solving the problem of the occupied areas; and solving accommodation and other problems facing the participants in the war for the homeland.

So, that session was in its own way the drafting of the program for the work and activity of the Croatian Government and all state bodies in implementing state policy as it is seen today and as it was specified in the agenda, taking as the starting point what I said in my address to the Assembly about the state of the nation and the state.

[Correspondent] [Name indistinct] from Zadar. Mr. President, if you invite NATO forces, in your capacity as Croatian state leader, to temporarily replace UNPROFOR in order to disarm the Serb bandits in the occupied areas and place Croatian police along Croatia's international recognized borders, is there then a possibility of deploying unreservedly friendly soldiers, particularly officers such as those from Germany and Turkey?

[Tudjman] First of all, let us make it clear: I said that NATO is drawing up plans to safeguard UNPROFOR's departure. As far as I am concerned, I suggested a long time ago to the international community that it would be more effective to deploy smaller NATO groups, as they would have greater authority and greater efficiency than these ineffective UNPROFOR groups with their varying degrees of skill. They are far removed from the problems they have encountered.

Even in this case, if NATO safeguarded UNPROFOR's departure, or else if NATO took over certain operations, we would not oppose in the least NATO groups' being deployed along Croatia's borders—in which case it would most certainly not depend on Croatia as to which countries would take part. NATO has its political and military leadership, so it would be up to them to decide on this.

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Serbia

Commentary Assesses Z-4 Plan, Serbs in Croatia

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[Commentary by Radivoje Petrovic: "The Other Side of the Z-4 Plan"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The announcement of the peace plan devised by the mini Contact Group, popularly called Z-4, has caused in recent days mostly negative reactions, as much for Croatia as for the public of the Krajina Serbs. While analysts and experts are competing in presenting each their own arguments for and against the plan, more careful observers have certainly noticed two political facts, extremely important for the stability of the future relations in the region, which were not discussed at all at the first debates.

Without ignoring the initial dissatisfaction of the leadership of the republic of Serbian Krajina [RSK] with the document proposed—which has not even been formally taken into consideration because of the Croatian dismissal of UNPROFOR [UN Protection Force]—it is hard not to notice that the peace mediators have defined the majority of the solutions precisely in the manner that indirectly regards the years-long critique of the Croatian political system and its attitude toward the Serbian people.

On the other hand, such generosity of the representatives of the influential states that are politically more inclined toward Croatia indicates also their conviction that, with regard to the rights of the Serbs in Croatia, nothing will change either more considerably or soon.

Those knowledgeable about Serbian-Croatian relations are aware that the conflict in this former Yugoslav republic broke out precisely because of the disregard of the national rights of the Serbian people, who, by the way, had had the status of a nationally constructive entity up until Tudjman attained power. All the Serbian objections and criticisms against the new Croatian authorities were reduced to the fear of the revival of the Ustasha movement [Croatian fascists in World War II] or fascism in a milder form and demands for recognizing the same rights to the Serbs in Croatia that had already been recognized to the Croats in that state. The peacemakers, who are better at logic, ought to correct those mistakes, so that the relations can heal and fears calm down.

However, since many details in the behavior of the Croats indicate that the future of the Serbs in Croatia will not flourish, the mini Contact Group has put forward a proposal that may cause plenty of objections, but that also takes into consideration what the Serbs have been pointing to all along. Thus Europe and the world agree that the Croatian checkered flag should not wave above Serbs' heads, that kunas [Croatian currency] should not clink in their pockets, that ZNG [People's Guard Corps] members should not hang around Serbian regions, that Serbs should be able to associate freely with their mother country, even though a sort of formal consent by Zagreb is required, that the Serbs should have their own police....

Everything that even slightly invokes the memories of the Serbian people in Croatia of the past time has been left out as a possible provocation. Thereby Europe has actually certified a charge against the current Croatian authority, accusing it of being undemocratic, disregardful of basic civil and national rights, and also that in many details, it comes dangerously close to the notorious Independent Republic of Croatia [World War II fascist Croatian state], whose traditions the Croatian authorities openly foster.

If, in the media war several years ago, the European and world protectors of Croatia turned a blind eye to this fact, today it is clear that, essentially, it is precisely the basic problem from which one should start. In the proposed projects, the Krajina Serbs may find many reasons for dissatisfaction and disagreement, but it could be said that they have won at least one battle—the peace mediators acknowledge, giving way to political pragmatism, that the causes of the Serbian dissatisfaction with the Croatian authorities are sound. A different thing is that they have tried to disguise such a reluctant acknowledgment of the reality by a combination of settlements involving autonomy, that, just like those specifying Knin and Glina as autonomous counties, do not have any perspective.

Furthermore, any overt satisfaction with such a diagnosis of the Croatian government is ill-suited as well. Because, the main architects in this mini Contact Group stem from those political environments that considerably contributed to the outbreak of the civil war in the region. Consequently, their acknowledgement of reality does not indicate any greater change in the policy on the crisis in former Yugoslavia, but rather a deep conviction that bridges of cooperation between the Serbs and the Croatian authorities guaranteeing peace will not be erected for quite a long time yet.

Thus in creating new relations, one has taken the line of least resistance: Instead of forcing the new Croatian authorities to accept the criteria and standards of modern civilization regarding civil and national rights, the already established rules of behavior toward the Serbs have been adopted as final and unchangeable, while the proposed solutions are seen as a remedy that eliminates a part of the risk.

Even though, judging from everything that has been stated so far, one can hardly find any connecting points between the Croatian authorities and the Krajina Serbs, necessary political caution makes it necessary for Knin to single out what obviously suits it in the latest peace proposal and avoid, even if unofficially, a total rejection of the entire project. By such an approach, it is possible

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to achieve in a more efficient and expeditious way the revision of those parts of the plan that do not suit the Serbs in Croatia.

Commentary Views Role of Milosevic's Wife

AU0602121395 Belgrade NASA BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 1 Feb 95 p 7

[Commentary by Branislav Milosevic: "It Is Already Too Late"]

[FBIS Translated Text] During the time when the present Serbian Constitution was being discussed, warnings and reproaches were expressed regarding the powers of the president of the republic. It was claimed that his powers are too broad and that they endanger the functions of the assembly and create the basis for the development of a Bonaparte-like rule.

The public discussion of the constitutional powers of the president [Slobodan Milosevic] did not refer to the powers of his wife [Mirjana Markovic]. Over the last few years, it has been proven, however, that, in certain matters, the informal powers of the president's wife are broader than the formal powers of the president. This indirectly confirms the thesis that the Serbian Constitution enables the development of a Bonaparte-like rule and legitimizes discussion of the informal powers of the president's wife.

Of course, those who even think that the behavior and the status of the Serbian president's wife is equal to the status of wife of the former dictator of a neighboring country [Romania] are exaggerating. Fortunately, their positions cannot be compared, because in Serbia it is at least possible to discuss the similarities and differences between them freely. If we agree that politics and public life are not governed by the state, we must admit that public life is already considerably infected by a dangerous focus of public opinion and by actions inspired and, in a certain sense, also led by Mrs. President.

People can still remember how the authorities changed their attitude toward the strike of high-school students last year. Educational and other authorities considered how to punish the disobedient students for several days and then suddenly realized that the students were right. There were rumors that it was the "mistress of the house" who opened their eyes. Among "the converted" was the young principal of a Belgrade high school who drew attention to herself because she changed her opinion within 24 hours. First she called for the students to be punished severely, but then she started to support them so ardently that even the students felt uneasy. The children grew up and the principal—instead of becoming an officer in charge of national defense, for example—became one of their favorite civil servants in the educational system.

The president's wife has become famous in Serbia owing to her column in a well-known magazine [DUGA]. Her texts would probably not be read and analyzed as carefully as they are if it had not been noticed that they—apart from lyric descriptions of nature and society—contain announcements of serious political events and turns in the country. Foreign political analysts have called this column a horoscope, trying to draw the attention to the clairvoyance of the author, but they have, in the meantime, realized that her announcements generally do not come true.

In her first column in 1995, the president's wife discussed Europe in 1995. In her text, dated 23 December 1994, she criticized—in a way unparalleled in Serbian conservative, left- or right- wing publications—"hirelings" and traitors who, following the orders of foreign powers and masters, edit or write for independent media or write. In her opinion, the hirelings and traitors are participating in a process of colonization of Eastern Europe that is being carried out under the motto of "democratization and the introduction of the market economy to Eastern Europe."

Before we continue with the analysis of these thoughts, we have to remind the readers that a special unit of the Federal Government, led by the federal information minister, stormed the independent BORBA on the evening of 23 December 1994 and started the procedure of physical destruction of this independent paper—in other words, it began to prevent the colonization of Serbia, at least through this medium. This means that the date 23 December 1994 is no coincidence in the diary of the president's wife. This will certainly remain a (sad) day in the history of Yugoslav and European journalism, even a long time after our author has stopped explaining in her columns why it is honorable to fight against the free press.

It is not difficult to conclude that she thinks that Eastern Europe was free four years ago, during the communist era, and that the process of colonization is under way now. For someone who is as deeply involved in the communist and Bolshevist spiritual and political tradition, who feels at home in the present primitive communist Russia, and who thinks that she has to fulfill a historic task in Serbia as Mrs. Milosevic, this conclusion is neither exaggerated nor unexpected.

The problem lies in the fact, however, that Mrs. President has not realized yet that because of her intimate relationship with the official leadership, the credibility of her political statements very much depends on how consistent her political assessments are. It is not possible to accuse the independent media of betrayal and, at the same time, hush up the behavior of the official leadership, which visits Al-Qadhdhafi (in his tent), or Husayn (in his bunker), three of four times a year in order to sell them weapons and buy cheap oil for this frozen nation. The Serbian people are probably not interested in fraternizing with those who have been abandoned by the whole world. Take 2

When representatives of Yugoslav independent media appear in the European Parliament, their statements are

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followed carefully and they are treated as representatives of an unhappy nation that has to be helped. When the president of the state created by the ruling parties in Serbia and Montenegro takes the floor at the same place, he is disdained and mocked.

One does not have to be especially intelligent to conclude that the independent media or, to use simpler language, those that do not serve the present leadership, are fulfilling an historic task for a large part of the Serbian people and the Serbian citizens because they are their weak, but permanent voice. They inform the world that Serbia and its citizens are different from the Serbian leadership; this is the core of the truth about Serbia, which has so many difficulties in finding its way into the world.

Two painful weeks have passed since Mrs. President started her campaign against the independent media and the traitors they harbor, during which time no one, not even professional independent journalists, has responded to the thesis on the colonization of Serbia "under the motto of democracy." In the meantime, the independent BORBA was liquidated and NASA BORBA founded. The process of "colonization" and the regressive process of "liberation" seem to go hand in hand.

A confident follower of the antibureaucratic revolution, who made his political career on constitutional issues, issued a statement at the time when the constitutional powers of the president were being discussed. In this statement, he opposed most of his colleagues by stating that the president's powers were neither too broad nor too narrow.

This political friend of the ruling family informs us today from the position of a deputy prime minister of the Serbian Government: "Nobody has blackened Serbia and the Serbian people since the Battle of Kosovo as much as the allegedly free press."

He seems to be convinced that he can never be wrong, not even regarding issues about which he knows very little or nothing at all. He still adheres to Mrs. Milosevic's horoscope and to those who raised him from dull anonymity to the rank of Slobodan Jovanovic (not the one from Vranje, for God's sake) [identity not further specified] during the antibureaucratic revolution.

The historical hierarchy of evil has been established: the Turks, the independent media, and the democratic world that supports the independent media. This is what the Serbian leaderships thinks and says, and how its acts, in 1995.

The darkness prevails. It is already too late. Where do we live? And with whom?

Opposition Parties To Cooperate in Elections

LD1302175395 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1717 GMT 13 Feb 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, Feb. 13 (TANJUG)—The presidents of three parliamentary opposition parties on Monday signed an agreement on cooperation in the local organs of authority in Serbia.

At a press conference, Vojislav Seselj of the Serbian Radical Party, Zoran Djindjic of the Democratic Party, and Vojislav Kostunica of the Democratic Party of Serbia said the agreement was realistic and marked a watershed in cooperation among Serbia's opposition.

The meeting was not attended by president of the opposition Serbian Renewal Movement, Vuk Draskovic, or any other representative of that party, although it had earlier been announced that this party would be among the signatories of the agreement.

Kostunica, who hosted the meeting, said the agreement would take effect on Feb. 15, and that it would be made possible for Draskovic to sign the agreement by that date.

Under the text of the agreement, the three opposition parties will appear separately during the first round of by-election for local organs, and jointly support the opposition candidate in the second round.

This will be the procedure as long as the current law on local self-administration in Serbia is in effect. If the law is amended and only one election round is introduced, the signatory-parties will appear with a common candidate.

In that event, half the candidates would be divided equally among the parties, and the other half would be determined on the grounds of the results which the individual parties achieved at the 1993 elections.

The agreement specifies that it is sufficient that each party come out with its list of candidates for the republican and federal elections, as so far, and secure control of the voting process.

If a majority election system is introduced at these levels as well, the three signatory-parties agreed to appear with a single list of candidates.

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